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Abstract 
Most research on Chinese protests’ outcomes focuses on aspects such as the strength, 
resources, and strategy choices of these protests. Although studies on Chinese contentious 
politics have taken great consideration of the significant role played by the state in the 
political process, little attention has been paid to the state itself which is actually the provider 
of “political opportunity”. With a state-centered perspective, this thesis examines how elite 
division within the authority shapes the Chinese local governments’ policy responses to 
popular protests. Based on a case of protest in Shifang, an environmental protest targeting the 
Shifang local government on its construction of a chemical plant, this study shows an elite 
division between the Shifang local government and the police force who were dispatched to 
Shifang to maintain stability by its vertical professional leadership and how this division has 
contributed to a successful policy outcome of this protest. To further understand the Shifang 
case in a larger institutional background of China’s modern political climate, this chapter 
provides a possible explanation that the elite division in the Shifang case is an embodiment of 
the structural division between Chinese local governments and the stability maintenance 
system which has grown into a powerful interests group as a result of the policy priority of 
maintaining rigid social stability in the last decade. 
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Chapter I:  Introduction 
It is almost a consensus among scholars of Chinese contentious politics that despite the 
increasing number of popular protests in present day China, these protests are far from 
revolutionary turmoil. According to the observers, popular protests in China are mostly 
“trouble making” tactics which remain submissive to the authority as a mode of political 
participation,1 and some also contend that popular protests have been normalized to a certain 
extent by the adaptive Chinese government in recent decades2. When examining the attributes 
of Chinese protests, Xi Chen demonstrates that “National leaders shun meaningful 
democratic reform but seem to believe that ‘facilitating’ and even ‘routinizing’ social protests 
help maintain stability” 3 , while at the same time “Chinese citizens have exploited the 
opportunities created by the evolution of government structures in recent decades.” 4  In 
addition, Perry also concludes that the contemporary patterns of protests in China are more 
system-supportive than system-subversive.5 
Agreeing with this judgment on Chinese contemporary protests, nevertheless, Chinese 
citizens who stage resistance are still in a weak legal position as their actions often violate the 
law or government regulations. 6Thus, given the sensitive nature of authoritarian regime 
towards social resistance, staging protests in China is by no means a safe or interesting task 
                                                             
1  Xi Chen (2012 ). “Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China”, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. P15 
2 Andrew Mertha (2009), “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy 
Process. The China Quarterly, Vol. 200 (December 2009), pp. 995-1012. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305741009990592 
3 Xi Chen (2012 ). “Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China”, New York: Cambridge 
University Press.p8 
4 Ibid 
5 Elizabeth Perry (2008), “Permanent rebellion? Continuities and Discontinuities in Chinese Protest”, Kevin J. 
O’Brien, “Popular Protest in China”, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
6 Yongshun Cai (2008). “Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in China”, The China 
Quarterly, Vol.193, pp. 24-42 , doi:10.1017/S0305741008000027 
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since the response of Chinese government towards any specific protest is still unpredictable 
and conditional.7 On one hand, it seems Chinese governments are more likely to tolerate or 
make concession to some of the protests in recent years. For example, almost all anti-PX 
protests8 in recent years, such as Xiamen, Ningbo, and Chengdu anti-PX protests, promptly 
received rather positive policy responses from local governments. This phenomenon seems to 
deliver a message to the public that the most effective way to resolve their grievance is to 
stage protests and bargain with the government. “A major fuss for a major settlement, a small 
fuss for a small settlement, no fuss no settlement”, this Chinese proverb is always used by 
Chinese citizens to describe the attitude of governments when dealing with popular protests. 
As a consequence, the threshold of public resistance is becoming lower in recent years.9 On 
the other hand, there is no doubt that the modern authoritarianism still has robust tools to 
suppress dissent10. In some occasions, the governments severely punished or suppressed the 
participants without considering their demands even in some non-regime-threatening cases. 
So, what is the rationale behind Chinese governments’ response towards popular protests? 
And what factors will contribute to the governments’ inclination to make positive policy 
adjustment? 
So far, most research on Chinese governments’ policy responses are focusing on aspects 
such as the strength, resources, strategy choices of these protests, and specific social groups 
                                                             
7 Yongshun Cai (2008). “Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in China”, The China 
Quarterly, Vol.193, pp. 24-42 , doi:10.1017/S0305741008000027 
8 “PX” refers to P-Xlyne, which is an aromatic hydrocarbon based on benzene with two methyl substituents with 
the chemical formula C8H10 or C6H4(CH3)2. Overexposure of p-xylene in humans can cause headache, fatigue, 
dizziness, listlessness, confusion, irritability, gastrointestinal disturbances including nausea and loss of appetite, 
flushing of the face, and a feeling of increased body heat.  
9 Zhao Dingxin, “Will Revolution Happen in Today’s China?”, 21 Century Review, 134, Dec 2012 p 4-16  
10 Sidney Tarrow, “Prologue: The New Contentious Politics in China: Poor and Blank or rich and Complex”, in 
Kevin J. O’Brien (ed.), “Popular Protest in China”, (Harvard University Press, 2008), p 10 
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which are more effective on influencing governments’ policy-making process. All these 
works shed important light on the study of protests’ outcomes or policy responses in 
contemporary China. Also, these scholars have taken great consideration of the significant 
role played by the state in the political process. However, to date, little attention has been 
paid to the state itself which is actually the provider of “political opportunity” in this process. 
There is still lack of sufficient work focusing on internal factors within the state which have 
contributed to the government’s preference to make policy responses.  
Without denying the importance of the strength and strategy for a particular protest to 
achieve its goal, by examining a specific case of Shifang protest, this article demonstrates that 
under a certain circumstance, the positive policy response rests on the elite division within 
the authority and the role played by Chinese local governments who sometimes prefer to 
fulfill their responsibility to citizens as a reaction to the pressure of the elite division. In 
Shifang case, the protestors who demanded cancelling a chemical refinery plant were fiercely 
suppressed by police promptly after it took place. Soon after the suppression, a number of 
bloody images and videos started to spread on the internet and “Shifang Protest” became the 
key words of Chinese Microblog (Weibo). Moreover, this protest had also caused criticism 
towards Shifang local government from the central government. However, in contrast to the 
behavior of the police, Shifang local government showed an abnormally benign attitude 
towards the protesters in this process and made concessions by gradually changing their 
policy and in the end promised to give up the plant forever.  
By comparing different attitudes and behaviors of different actors in Shifang case, I 
contend that there is an elite division between the police department and Shifang local 
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government. This elite division led to the final positive policy response from the Shifang 
local government. This thesis proposes to do a signal case study and the Shifang protest is 
selected because it is a “tough” case which is almost unlikely to achieve positive policy 
response in light of the existing literature which assess the possibility of a protest to achieve 
success by its participants, resources, leverages, social networks, and strategies. All these 
factors and alternative explanations will be examined in Chapter three.  
To understand the Shifang protest in a larger social and political environment and to 
analyze the elite division from the structural level of China’s present political condition, this 
thesis further explains the elite division in the Shifang case as a result of the Chinese central 
government’s policy priority in the term of President Hu Jintao. In the last decade, especially 
from the second term of Hu, rigid maintenance of social stability became the top concern of 
Chinese central government and a complete “stability maintenance” system was established 
covering all institutional levels of Chinese government. With great amount of financial 
expenditure and excessive power of using violence and political resources, the “stability 
maintenance” system became a powerful interest group comprised of a range of government 
agencies with a large population of its members from central to local levels. Under this 
circumstance, local government leaders were seriously devoted to maintain social stability by 
cooperating with the “stability maintenance” agencies for their common interest. There is no 
doubt that Chinese local government also gained great benefits from this policy orientation, 
such as the increase of local GDP and personal goods of government officials by using the 
excessive power of violating citizens’ rights and suppress public resistance.  
There are two mechanisms which led to the division between the stability maintenance 
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system and local government leaders. 1) As the number of popular protests increased rapidly 
in recent years, Chinese local governments were exhausted by the financial burden of 
maintaining social stability by suppression and supervision. 2) As the performance in 
maintaining social stability became the top concern for assessing cadres, local government 
leaders face great pressure from upper level. However, the “stability maintenance” agency 
use violence towards popular protest to exaggerate social conflicts and thus maintaining their 
power. In addition, with the wide use of internet and the developing rights consciousness 
among citizens, it becomes hard to maintain social stability by suppression.      
There is an ambiguous nature of Chinese local government and in this thesis I define this 
ambiguous nature of the local government as “amphibiousness”. The term of 
“Amphibiousness” is first used by X. L. Ding to describe the organizations between state and 
civil society and extended by Xi Chen in studying formal institutional agencies. This thesis 
further applies this term to describe the characteristics of Chinese local government. On one 
hand, Chinese local government makes profit from depriving ordinary citizens. On the other 
hand, it is responsible for local management. Thus, when cooperating with the “stability 
maintenance” agency to deprive citizens leads to a miserable situation for local government 
leaders, it becomes a rational choice for them to please the citizens by satisfying their 
requirements.  
This study intended to provide a possible explanation for the policy outcome of Chinese 
popular protest. However, it is always risky to summarize from a single case. Answers 
provided in this research give rise to hypothesis that must wait for future testing.  
 
6 
 
Organization of this Thesis 
The following chapters investigate the causal relationship between elite division and 
government’s policy response by undertaking close scrutiny of the Shifang Protest, which 
took place in Sichuan Province, 2012.  
Chapter two aims to locate this research in the existing literature and to explain relevant 
concepts in this study. Focusing on the outcome aspect of Chinese popular protests, this 
chapter narrows the concept of “outcome” down to the specific policy adjustment demanded 
by protestors in this specific case, in order to avoid overestimating the impact of the 
independent variable. Several available approaches were examined in this chapter and I use a 
“Political Opportunity Structure Model” as the underlying theory of this research. This 
chapter exposes a lack of sufficient work on the internal factors within the state actor and 
places great emphasis on the influence of the elite division between the police department and 
local government on the policy outcome of the Shifang protest.  
Chapter three turns to the case study of the Shifang protest, which took place in Sichuan 
Province in 2012. In this chapter, I first make a thorough description of the background of 
this incident and the interaction between different actors in the process. This chapter 
demonstrates the existence of the elite division between the police department and Shifang 
local government and analyzes how this particular division led to a positive policy adjustment 
by exerting pressure on Shifang local government. Moreover, this chapter also discusses 
alternative explanations which also seem plausible to interpret this case.  
Chapter four discusses the case from the structural level of China’s political condition 
and its policy evolution. This chapter demonstrates the development of China’s “Stability 
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Maintenance” system in the past decade and illustrates the mechanisms leading to a division 
of Chinese local government from cooperating with the “Stability Maintenance” agencies. 
Besides exposing the non-monolithic nature of the Chinese government, this research also 
challenges the conventional wisdom that the state’s response to popular protests only comes 
from the tension between the state and the civil society. In contrast, from the perspective of 
this study, the state is struggling with both the intense pressure from inside and outside the 
regime.  
As a conclusion, chapter five demonstrates that the policy responses of Chinese local 
government to popular protests reflect both its struggle with internal tension and its 
compromise to the increasing number of social resistance. However, whether this elite 
division exists widely in other cases or whether it will have stable impact on Chinese 
contentious politics still awaits further study. 
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Chapter II: Concepts and Literature Review 
Research on social movements and popular protests has usually addressed issues of 
emergence, mobilization, and outcomes.11 Focusing on the dimension of protest outcomes 
and policy responses, this chapter first clarifies several relevant concepts used in this research, 
such as, “outcome”, “settlement”, and “policy adjustment”. By distinguishing these concepts, 
this research aims to examine the policy response dimension of protest outcomes in order to 
avoid overestimating the impact of the independent variable. Second, this chapter displays 
several approaches which have been used to study policy response and explains the necessity 
of using a political opportunity structure approach in the study of the Shifang protest. As the 
state actor is regarded as an independent variable in this study, this chapter takes a thorough 
examination of dimensions of “state” and “political opportunity” to avoid concept stretching. 
Third, although the political opportunity structure model is widely used in studying Chinese 
contentious politics, this chapter exposes the lack of sufficient work which focusing on the 
internal factors of the state actor with a state-centered perspective. Regarding the elite 
division as an independent variable, this study proposes to analyze the “political opportunity” 
in the Shifang case from both the perspective of the contingent opportunity in the particular 
case and the stable political structure of present-day China.  Fourth, this chapter also displays 
existing theoretical framework on studying the policy-making mechanism of China and 
demonstrates the characteristics and action logic which shapes the policy preference of 
Chinese local government. 
 
                                                             
11 Macro G. Giugni (1998). Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements, 
Annual Reviews, Vol. 24 (1998), pp. 371-393. 
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2.1 Explaining Protest Outcomes and Policy Responses 
If we devote ourselves to study the outcomes of social movements and popular protests, 
what are the specific dimensions of a particular outcome should be examined? Is it possible 
to make a judgment on whether a protest is successful or has failed? Of course the main goal 
of popular protests is to bring changes; sometimes however, the ultimate outcomes of protests 
are even unintended by these protestors themselves. That is mainly because outcomes of 
popular protests can take different forms in a single case: not only concerning the fate of the 
challenging groups, but also influencing other aspects of the society by changing 
government’s policy preference, shifting public attention, or even providing new ideologies. 
Gamson divides the outcomes of social movements and protests into two categories, “one 
concerned with the fate of the challenging group as an organization and one with the 
distribution of new advantages to the group’s benefit.”12 In studying democracy movements 
in Eastern Europe, Giugni also suggests that, besides the political and policy outcomes of 
social movements, broader culture and institutional effects should also be taken into 
consideration.13  
In this study, as for research of protest outcomes of present-day China, is it the same as 
what it is like in Western countries or it should be measured differently in the Chinese 
political context? Although existing literature on democratic countries does shed important 
light on the study of Chinese popular protests outcomes, it is by no means a casual task to 
assess the protest outcomes in present day China. Popular protests in post-Mao China can be 
                                                             
12 Gamson, W. (1990). The strategy of social protest (2nd ed., p. 28), Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing. 
13 Macro G. Giugni (1998). Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements, 
Annual Reviews, Vol. 24 (1998), pp. 371-393. 
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divided into different phases. The first phase is between 1976 and 1989, in this period, a 
considerable number of large-scale protests happened as a result of the tragic policies of 
Mao’s era. After 1989 Beijing student movements, as a consequence of social changes 
brought by market-oriented economic reform, new emerging popular protests mainly focus 
on economic issues.14 Although Zhao Dingxin further divides protests after 1989 into two 
phases by their degree of populist tendency, most of these protests have common 
characteristics, such as aiming at economic issues, targeting local governments, and being 
limited in time, space, and scope. Thus, we regard these protests emerged after 1990s as a 
new noticeable phenomenon in Chinese society. Under this circumstance, there has not get 
been enough time to examine the enduring impact of these protests currently. Moreover, as 
there are hardly any influential protests which can be compared with the 1989 student 
movement or the democracy movements in Eastern Europe; it is difficult for us to observe the 
cultural or institutional influence of a single case. Thus, most research on protest outcomes in 
China actually focus on the government’s settlements of the protests rather than these protests’ 
indirect outcomes.  
Even ignoring the difficulties discussed above on measuring the cultural and 
institutional dimension of Chinese protest outcomes, it is always a reasonable and effective 
approach to explain Chinese protest outcomes by focusing on the role played by the state. 
Unlike modern western social movements which are mostly peaceful and issue-oriented, 
which are sometimes even too institutionalized to be called social movements15, Chinese 
                                                             
14 Dingxin Zhao (2011). Book Review, Collective Resistance in China: Why Poplular Protests Succeed or Fail. 
Contemporary Sociology, A Journal of Reviews. vol.40. no. 2 (March  2011). pp. 161-162.  
 
15 Donatella Della Porta (1995). Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative analysis of 
Italy and Germany. New York: Cambridge University Press, p1 
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popular protests are still in weak legal status and their outcomes still highly depend on the 
governments’ reaction. Since suppression is still one of the important modes used by Chinese 
local government to deal with popular protests, Cai Yongshun examines the rationale of 
Chinese local government of using suppression with a study of 66 cases. In this research, Cai 
suggests that “Suppression becomes the option when concessions are difficult to make and 
citizen resistance threatens social stability, policy implementation or local officials’ image”16. 
Besides using suppression as a settlement of popular protests, Chinese government also make 
concessions to the resistance or use a combination of both suppression and concession.17 
Concessions made by the government can be understood as completely or partially 
meeting the protestors’ demands. Although economic compensation used to appease the 
protestors can also be regarded as concession, meaningful concession is mainly embodied in 
government’s policy adjustment. Policy adjustment can be defined as, “the revision or 
abolition of policies that have directly caused or failed to address citizens’ grievance, as well 
as the creation of new policies to address the problems that have triggered resistance or to 
accommodate protester’s demand.”18 In terms of the level of policy adjustment, it is not 
difficult to understand that cancelling a specific plant in a community is not as meaningful 
and outstanding as a policy response such as establishing an institutional public hearing 
channel. Generally speaking, a meaningful policy adjustment such as establishing new 
institutions cannot be ascribed to the specific contribution of one protest. A deliberate change 
of policy preference always comes from long-existing social conflicts and constant 
                                                             
16 Yongshun Cai (2008). Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in China. The China 
Quarterly, Vol.193, pp. 24-42 . doi:10.1017/S0305741008000027 
17 Yongshun Cai (2010). Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press. p 7 
18 Ibid, p.13 
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requirements for a sustainable resolution. Hence, while a prominent policy response is always 
the goal of participants in a collective action, it is risky for an observer to overestimate the 
effectiveness of a single case. Thus, to clearly identify the causal mechanism between elite 
division as an independent variable and policy response as a dependent variable, this study 
exclusively focuses on the specific policy adjustment made by the government as a response 
to the specific protest. And in the study of Shifang case, policy response can be defined as the 
gradual concession made by the Shifang government to cancel the policy of constructing the 
Hongda refinery plant. 
Conventional research always regards suppression and concession as two alternative 
options selected by a same subject, however in this study, I suggest that different 
bureaucratic actors that may have different option preference. And as a consequence, their 
division may influence the final policy outcome of the protests.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Approaches to Study Chinese Protest Outcomes 
It is not a long history since the role of the state was brought into the scope of studying 
social movements and protests, although it seems nothing unusual for the students of 
contentious politics today. In this section, we will talk about four main approaches to analyze 
social movements and protests, and all these approaches have been used to explain Chinese 
social resistance in the present day.  
 
A Grievance-based Approach 
Protests and social movements were first regarded as grievance-based, emotional and 
13 
 
irrational collective action from the perspective of psychology before the wave of social 
movements in Western Countries in 1960s. Although the study of contentious politics today 
sees social resistance as collective action more than a result of a social or economic structure 
after the emergence of resource mobilization theory, grievance-based explanations can also 
be used to demonstrate the origin of particular social resistance or motivation of special social 
groups. However, this approach mainly focuses on analyzing the reasons which may cause 
the potential impulse of people to stage resistance, but is incapable of explaining the outcome 
of a certain collective action.   
 
The Resource Mobilization Theory 
With the emergence of social movements in western countries struggling for minority’ 
rights, such as student, Afro-American and women’s movements, people started to change 
their bad impression towards social movements which is regarded irrational in the past. 
Resource mobilization theory, which stresses on the value of increasing resources, social 
networks and organization in the development of a social movement, became dominant at 
that time. However, this approach is not as widely used by Chinese scholars as other theories 
since most Chinese social resistance has weak organizational bases. Mature social 
organization and effective social networks are both scarce resources in present Chinese 
political climate. Even so, there are still some noticeable works focusing on the 
organizational aspect of particular groups, such as farmers and students. In the study of rural 
resistance in contemporary China, Yu Jianrong demonstrates the existence of rural resistance 
organizations and social networks which have been established by rural elites. Different knots 
14 
 
within the network are coordinated by a stable rural elite committee and they cooperate with 
each other to mobilize protests with legal methods.19 Also, when examining the 1989 Beijing 
students’ movement, Zhao Dingxin also emphasizes the function of students’ dormitories as 
the organizational base of this particular movement. Despite focusing on the mobilization 
aspect of the student movement, Zhao also demonstrates how the state actor shaped the 
mobilizing structure and the cultured framing strategy during this movement. 20  Thus, 
according to Zhao, both the state actor and the state-society relationship play a significant 
role in shaping Chinese contentious politics, even in the organizational and the cultural 
dimensions. 
 
The Political Opportunity Structure Model 
In accordance with the opinion of Zhao, most Chinese scholars today have embraced the 
model of “political opportunity structure” which stresses on the role of the state actor in 
analyzing Chinese popular protests. However, before the political opportunity structure 
model became a dominant theory in western countries, there was a long period when 
“sociologists discuss social movements without assessing their relationship with 
institutionalized political processes, while the political scientists have traditionally 
conceptualized power almost exclusively in institutional terms”21. To bridge the gap between 
social movement study and political institutions, Tilly and McAdam outlined an alternative 
“political process” model of social movement. This model claims that the emergence of 
                                                             
19 Yu Jianrong(2004), “An explanation of Chinese rural social resistance”, Sociology Study, 2, 49-55. 
20  Zhao, D. (2000), “State-society relations and the discourses and activities of the 1989 beijing student 
movement”, American Journal of Sociology, 105(6), 1592-1632. 
21 Doug McAdam, “Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970”, (The University of 
Chicago Press) p 2 
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widespread protest activities is the result of both the expanding political opportunities and the 
development of indigenous organizations in modern societies. The concept of political 
opportunity was developed by Tarrow in the book “Power in movement: social movements 
and contentious politics”, which is regarded as a textbook of the “political opportunity 
structure” model. In Tarrow’s model, political opportunity can be understood as the 
possibility provided by the state for social movements to set their agendas and influence 
politics. With the development of this theoretical model, it is widely accepted and used by 
Chinese scholars as it is hard not to consider the influence of the state when examining social 
resistance within an authoritarian regime.  
To define the concept of “political opportunity structure”, Tarrow specified it into two 
levels: temporary or short-term changes in opportunity and the stable aspects of opportunity 
structure that condition movement formation and strategy.22 However, the concept of political 
opportunity is always criticized as too broad and there is no clear border to distinguish what 
is political opportunity and what is not. Tarrow also admitted that this model is a group of 
variables rather than a single one. 23 To clarify the concept of “political opportunity” by 
delimiting the boundary “state”, Huang Dongya breaks down the concept of the role of “State” 
into three categories, 1) stable political structure, such as the nature and the basic institution 
of the state; 2) relatively stable political environment, such as the ability of the regime to 
instill its idea to the society and the strategy of the state to deal with popular protests in a 
particular period; 3) flexible political background, such as the closing or opening of the 
regime, elite division, unstable political alliance, the capability of policy implement, and so 
                                                             
22 Sidney Tarrow (1994). “Power in Movement.” New York: Cambridge University Press, p.89 
23 Sidney Tarrow, “’Aiming at a Moving Target’: Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe.” 
Political science and Politics 24 (1)   
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on.24 This conceptualization of “state” provides a clearer understanding of the roles of the 
state actor in the study of contentious politics.  
 
Strategic Framing of Popular Protests 
There are also existing literatures focusing on the strategic framing dimension of 
Chinese popular protests. This approach is also widely used to analyze the protest outcomes 
and policy responses. With a sample of 266 cases of grassroots collective action, Cai 
Yongshun examines the outcomes of Chinese popular protests with a “cost-benefit calculation” 
model. In his book, Cai summarizes his findings as: “The resisters' chance of success lies in 
their ability to exploit the constraints facing the government or to reshape the latter's cost-
benefit calculations in a way that suppressing or ignoring an act of resistance is not a feasible 
or desirable option”25.    Other prominent works also shed light on the relationship between 
strategic framing and policy response. For example, from analyzing two cases in present-day 
China, the Falun Gong spiritual organization and the public posting of subversive “doorway 
couplets”, Thornton demonstrates that the adaptive strategy of articulating dissent in 
authoritarian regime should be irony, ambiguity and metonymy rather than defining problems 
clearly. 26  Besides examining protest outcomes by focusing on the strategic framing 
dimension, studies also demonstrate the effectiveness of specific groups in achieving success. 
In a study of homeowner resistance in Shanghai, Shi Fayong elaborates the advantages of a 
                                                             
24 Huang Dongya, “How the State Shape Contentious politics”, Research Review, (2011.2) p218-242 
25 Yongshun Cai (2008). “Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in China.” The China 
Quarterly, Vol.193, pp. 24-42 . doi:10.1017/S0305741008000027 p24-42 
26 Patric M. Thornton, “Framing Dissent in Contemporary China: Irony, Ambiguity and Metonymy”, the China 
Quarterly, 2002 p662-681 
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specific social class or group during the interaction with the state. By looking into the specific 
response of the local government and the leverage utilized by the protests, Shi concludes that 
the social networks of the middle class homeowners, such as their connection with individual 
government official and mass media, works effectively to increase their possibility to 
success.27  
As for the approach used in the study of the Shifang case, I suggest that the policy 
outcome of the Shifang protest is greatly influenced the by elite division between the police 
department and the Shifang local government, and this “elite division” can be regarded as a 
“political opportunity”. The Shifang protest is a non state-threatening environmental protest 
which can be regarded as a typically “Nimby” (Not in my back yard) campaign in present-
day China from the perspective of the grievance-based approach. Just the same as most of 
other popular protests in China, the Shifang protest is weak in its organizational base. 
Although the cyberspace played an important role in mobilizing this collective action, there is 
still lack of effective resources utilized in this protest even comparing with other successful 
protests in China. Other aspects of this particular case, such as the power, advocacy strategy 
and the feature of its participants, are all exposed and analyzed in the next chapter. By 
examining these variables which can also lead to positive policy outcomes in this particular 
case, this study demonstrate that the Shifang protest is not a forceful resistance in terms of its 
own characteristics. Thus, this thesis mainly focuses on the specific “political opportunity” 
aspect of the Shifang protest, and tries to explain why such a seemingly ordinary protest 
could receive a rather positive policy response from the local government.  
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In addition, it is also important to avoid being too structure-oriented and ignoring the 
interaction between the protests and the state. There is no doubt that while the state shapes 
social resistance, at the same time the resistance also shapes the state’s behavior in turn and 
resistance creates or exploits opportunities for themselves in the process of interaction. For 
example, when studying the advocacy of disabled people in China, Xi Chen analyses why the 
mass association, which was regarded as a weak actor in the formal political forum in China, 
would like to represent the public in some cases. He demonstrates that, when the motivation 
of the public becomes stronger, it is more likely that “state advocacy” will cooperate with 
“popular advocacy” to lobby the policy gatekeepers, who have the final words in the decision 
making process.28 In my study, even focusing on the variable of elite division, the thesis also 
regards the motivation of Shifang protesters, the use of internet and other communication 
technologies, and the public awareness of civil rights as conditions without which the elite 
division may not be as obvious as it was in this case.  
 
2.3 A State-Centered Political Opportunity Structure Model 
As evidence constantly accumulates for the growing tension within Chinese society, 
both Chinese and foreign scholars have begun to explore the richness of China’s emerging 
culture of contention with new analytical tools.29 In contrast to most of the Western popular 
protests which have already been institutionalized, protests in authoritarian regime are even 
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more influenced by the state’s power. As O’Brien suggests in the introduction of his book30 , 
when studying China, all contention reflects political constraints, and negotiates and contests 
these constraints.  
Although a large number of existing literature on Chinese contentious politics 
deliberated used or unintended borrowed the approach of political opportunity structure 
model, most of these literature just regard the state actor as an important constant rather than 
an actual variable. In other words, even it depends on the ability of the protestors to exploit 
political opportunities; the state actor itself also plays an important role in providing political 
opportunity and leaving space for social resistance to exist. However, up to now, there is still 
insufficient real “state-centered” work addressing the internal factors of the state actor which 
will also impact the outcome of the protest.  
Examining the limited number of existing literature with a “state-centered” approach, 
there are mainly three dimensions of the political opportunity that have been studied, 1) 
decline of Chinese party-state capacity to control society, 2) expanding political access 
provided by new established institutions and developing expectations raised by new policies, 
3) elite divisions within the authority.  
First, in recent years, the Hu administration has loosened both the state control over 
media coverage of local unrests and the control over local government by local management. 
Just as Tarrow describes, “as Chinese politics become less centralized and more difficult to 
control by a single actor, scholars are beginning to think about the kind of contention and the 
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sorts of issue that are likely to receive positive policy response.31” When examining the 
decline of party-state capacity, Andrew Mertha refers to a new concept of “Fragmented 
Authoritarianism”. He suggests that the previously-excluded members of the polity such as 
the media, non-governmental organizations and individual activists, have successfully 
entered the political process as a result of political pluralism of the fragmented 
authoritarianism.32 Given the lack of institutional channels, the governments prefer to form 
cooperation with social actors as “consultation and adoption”. Teets also suggests that, as a 
result of the declining state control of China, government-civil society collaboration form 
through the decentralization of public welfare.      
Second, expanding political access may encourage citizens to stage more resistance. 
When the access to political power is completely closed or open, people are not likely to 
express their grievance in public. However, “gaining partial access to power provides them 
with such incentives.” 33  In addition to expanding political access, new policies such as 
eliminating agriculture taxes, and the accessible image established by top leaders, will also 
raise the expectation of the public about the government. For example, Li Lianjiang examines 
why there was a “high tide” of “Petitioning Beijing” from 2003-06 and ascribes this 
phenomenon to a central leadership change in 2002. According to Li, Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiabao had adopted a more populist learder ship style which greatly encouraged citizens to 
approach the Xinfang system in Beijing. However, as the central government cannot deal 
with so many petitions, frustrated petitioners then adopted disruptive tactics and finally 
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receded under the suppression of the government. 
The third cluster of state-centered studies focuses on elite divisions within Chinese 
authority. Elite divisions can be multifaceted in different contexts, for example, the division 
between reformist and conservatives; higher and lower level governments; elites who are in 
power and who are not; strong department and weak department within the bureaucracy; 
representatives of different vested interest groups, and so on. According to existing literature 
on elite division in China to date, the division can be categorized into vertical division and 
horizontal division.34 
In his study of achieving successful protests in China, Cai Yongshun presents a vertical 
elite division as “central-local divide "35. Cai suggests that the central government has greater 
interest than the local government in protecting its legitimacy, thus the opportunity to achieve 
success lies in the popular protests’ ability to seek leverage from the central government. In 
contrast to Cai’s opinion, Michelson demonstrates the converse conclusion in his study of 
rural resistance. Also conceding that there exists a division between central and local 
governments, Michelson suggests that seeking resolution from local governments would be 
more effective since the local leaders are more sympathetic to local protesters while the 
central government are more inclined to ignore their interest.36 In terms of horizontal division, 
Lo and Leung studied the environmental policy-making process in Guangzhou and 
demonstrate that in developing countries; the environmental agencies are always weak 
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compared with other bureaus which are in charge of economic development. Thus, under 
certain circumstances, the environmental agencies sometimes take the initiative to cultivate 
the environmental awareness of the public and promote their eagerness to participate in the 
policy-making process.37  
In this thesis, both the decline of party-state capacity and the expanding of political 
access can be applied to the Shifang protest as a political background. However, both of these 
two conditions can be regarded as a stable and structural aspect of political opportunity in 
China. As O’Brien and Stern mentioned, there is not one unitary, national opportunity 
structure, but multiple, crosscutting openings and obstacles to mobilization.38 Not only do 
different cases include different political opportunities, even the same opportunity will reveal 
different dimensions in different context. When several mechanisms work together, it is more 
important to tell in what mechanism gain priority in a particular situation while in other cases 
other mechanisms had higher priority. As China is so large and complicated, it is always 
impossible to explain all the contention with a stable combination of several factors. Thus, we 
have to carefully look into the cases without taking their similarities for granted. By 
examining the Shifang protest, this study builds a hypothesis that the positive policy outcome 
of this case is caused by the division between the police system and the Shifang local 
government. This is an accurate and contingent political opportunity rather a common 
political background for a specific case. In order to understand this “elite division” from a 
structural level, this study also explains this temporary and contingent opportunity in the 
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Shifang case as a specific embodiment of the stable division between the stability 
maintenance system and Chinese local government in China’s present political contest. 
 
2.4 Policy Making of Chinese Local Governments 
Focusing on the policy outcomes of Chinese popular protests, this study also refers to 
the decision-making process of the Chinese bureaucratic system, especially the local 
governments. This section displays several theoretical frameworks which have been widely 
used by scholars to describe the decision-making mechanism of present-day China with 
respect to the whole political system. Moreover, this section demonstrates several factors 
which shape Chinese local governments’ policy making process. This study confirms that the 
decision-making process in China is fragmented and the Chinese local governments have to 
deal with multiple interest in the policy making process. Last, this study also illustrate that 
Chinese local governments has an institutional amphibious feature which contributes to its 
varied policy preference in different circumstance.    
 
Policy Making in China 
 Several theory frameworks have been developed by scholars to describe the decision 
making mechanism of China. This section selects three notable mechanisms among these 
frameworks---“bureaucratic pluralism”, “fragmented authoritarianism” and “consultative 
authoritarianism”--- to demonstrate the basic feature of Chinese decision making mechanism. 
What is worth mentioning here is that these frameworks are not stagnant; Scholars who 
support these models keep bringing new variables into these frameworks in order to cope 
with the changing of Chinese political environment.  
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 David Lampton describes the Chinese policy making model as a “Bureaucratic 
Equilibrium Policy-making System” 39  which derived from a “divided” and “centrally-
coordinated” policy-making system when examining the succession of health policy-making 
system from 1949 to 1974. Lampton demonstrates that there is a non-monolithic feature of 
the Chinese state structure, showing that the plethora of institutions and bureaucratic 
tensions in the Mao era shaped the policy process.40 In Lampton’s opinion, the decision 
making power in China is highly disaggregated by the competence within the bureaucratic 
system, and this theory is also concluded as “Bureaucratic pluralism”.   
The concept of “fragmented authoritarianism” was developed by Lieberthal, Oksenberg 
and Lampton based on the “bureaucratic pluralism” framework. This model argues the 
notion of “the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed.”41 
This fragmentation is structurally based on the bureaucratic ranking system and the 
functional division among various bureaucracies. This model remained the most durable and 
heuristic through which to study Chinese politics. It was also criticized for ignoring the 
efficacy of the civil society and the market 42 . Andrew Martha further developed this 
framework into “fragmented authoritarianism 2.0” and suggests that the policy-making 
process in Chinese has become pluralized as a result of the increasingly diverse demand of 
different “policy entrepreneurs”.43  
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Further emphasizing on the significance of the civil society on influencing the decision 
of the governments, Jessica Teets argues the existence of the local government-civil society 
collaboration in the policy-making process. According to Teets, “the decentralization of 
public welfare to local governments and the linkage of promotion to the delivery of these 
goods created the motivation for officials to collaborate with an emerging civil society”.44 
This model of analyzing Chinese government’s decision-making mechanism is concluded as 
“consultative authoritarianism”. 
  Thus, existing literature on studying the decision-making mechanism of the Chinese 
political system shed great light on the complexity of the current state structure. Even without 
legitimate channels for public participation, various factors have been brought to the policy 
making process of the Chinese government, including both the internal competence and 
tension within the regime and the external pressure from the civil society and other “policy 
entrepreneurs”. There is no doubt that the Chinese local government is a key actor within this 
policy-making system regarding its responsibility to the central government’s demands, its 
motivation of struggling for local benefits, and its direct contact with the public. The question 
then raises what factors influence the policy-making process of Chinese local governments?  
 
Policy Making of Chinese Local Governments 
To analyze the role played by local governments in dealing with popular protests, it is 
important to examine the factors that contribute to the decision-making process and the logic 
of action of Chinese local governments.  
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According to existing literature, some scholars regard local government as a local 
“industrial firm” which focuses on expanding local fiscal revenue and enhancing local 
economy45. As a result of the gradual tax reform carried out by central government in China 
since 1994, the redistribution of local fiscal revenue has increased the financial resources of 
central government while reducing the proportion of revenue left to local governments at the 
same time. This policy not only made local governments more dependent on central 
government funds, but also forced local government leaders to increase GDP by creating 
extra financial resources, such as urban expansion and land finance. Thus, from this 
perspective, the decision of local governments lies in its incentives for more financial 
consideration.  
In addition, there are some scholars interpreting local governments’ action as 
maximizing the interest of local government leaders. In terms of the interest of local 
government leaders, it includes not only incentives to gain personal benefits from depriving 
ordinary citizens, but also improving their performance and coordinating their behavior 
according to the expectation of upper-level authority. When examining the motivation of 
Chinese government officials to make public policies, Zhou Li’an developed a “Promotion 
Tournament Model”, which suggests that the economic miracle of China comes from the 
incentive system governing Chinese officials46. 
There is also existing literature focusing on the influence of interest groups on 
influencing the policy-making process of Chinese local governments. According to Luo 
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Yiping, the participation of interest groups into the policy-making process can be a double-
edged sword. On one hand, interest groups can contribute to the pluralism of the policy-
making mechanism and limit the power of the local government. On the other hand, local 
government can be kidnapped by the powerful interest groups with abundant political and 
economic resources.47   
Almost all these aspects discussed above appear in the case of Shifang. In fact, the 
Chinese local governments are dealing with multiple stakeholders and interest in the process 
of making public policies. The economic reform and the reshape of the central-local 
relationship created more opportunities for Chinese local governments to realize a 
“developmental localism” objective and to follow their internal incentives. Thus, local 
governments in China are by no means just executors of central governments’ demands or the 
so-called “public servants”, which is the phrase often used by them to describe themselves. In 
this circumstance, what is the role played by local government among the mix picture of 
different stakeholders and what is the rationale of Chinese local government to choose 
between different policy preferences? 
 
The Institutional Amphibiousness of Chinese Local Government 
This study interprets the logic of action of Chinese local government as a “rational actor” 
which shifts between different policy preference with a characteristic of “institutional 
amphibiousness”. “Institutional amphibiousness” was first coined by X.L.Ding to describe 
organizations which usually belong to civil society but are attached to government in China, 
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such as trade union, youth organizations, and women’s organizations. According to Ding, 
“First, the boundaries between institutional structures are ambiguous… Second, the nature of 
individual institutions is indeterminate”48 This amphibious nature of some organizations and 
institutions is connected with an elite division because when this particular amphibious 
institution inclined to fulfill its response of the public, it will stand opposed to its institutional 
partners.  
This theory was also used by Xi Chen to demonstrate the amphibious role played by 
Chinese mass organization of disabled person. After that, Chen further extends the 
application of this term to a wide range of government institutions other than “mass 
organizations”49. In his study, he labeled the Xinfang system as a amphibious government 
agency and illustrates that,  
“Institutions of interest articulation in state socialist regimes tend to be more 
amphibious; in contrast, the function of the army, police, and party propaganda 
apparatus is more clearly defined and therefore they have lower levels of or no 
amphibiousness.”50  
Thus, “Institutional Amphibiousness” can be understood as both functional and 
ideological characteristic. In this study, I also extend the application of this term to describe 
the nature of Chinese local governments who on one hand makes profits by depriving 
ordinary citizens, and on the other hand rely heavily on good performance legitimacy. The 
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amphibiousness of Chinese local government can be seen in both the multiple institutional 
purposes it serves and the shifting balance between the benefits and costs it faces. This 
feature and logic of action of Chinese local government explains the policy process in the 
case and Shifang, and help understand the collaboration and division between Chinese local 
governments and the stability maintenance system.  
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Chapter III: A Case Study of Shifang Protest 
The existence of elite division within the authority is pervasive in China. However, the 
effect of elite division is often neglected as it is not as obvious as other variables and requires 
careful scrutiny into the evidence which may seem nothing uncommon at first glance. Based 
on a case of protest in Shifang, an environmental protest targeting the Shifang local 
government on its construction of a chemical plant, this study shows a division between the 
Shifang local government and the police who were dispatched to Shifang to maintain stability. 
Although it might not be representative enough of the condition that all Chinese protests face, 
the Shifang case sheds light on a noticeable factor contributing to government policy 
adjustment, which should be regarded as an important aspect of successful resistance. This 
chapter first introduces the emergence and process of the Shifang protest, then demonstrates 
the existence of elite divisions between the police and Shifang local government by 
comparing their behaviors and analyzing the command system of Chinese public security 
police and armed police. In addition, this chapter also analyses the underlying mechanism 
through which the elite division between these two actors influences the policy outcome of 
this protest.  
 
3.1 Rise of Conflict in Shifang 
“Nimby” (Not in my back yard) campaigns have become a significant form of civil 
resistance in present-day China. Projects launched without public participation often arouse 
environmental concern of local residents and exaggerate their ever-present distrust of the 
authoritarian regime, especially these notorious local governments. Thus, protecting their 
31 
 
community environment always serves as an effective reason to assemble citizens and stage 
environmental campaigns in modern China.  
 Shifang is a county-level city, under the municipal administration of Deyang, Sichuan 
Province. It is located about 50 km from Chengdu with an area of 863 km² and with a 
population of about 430 thousand. Named as “Bright Pearl of West Sichuan”, Shifang is not 
only famous for its mineral water but also its rich phosphate rock. It was rated as one of the 
"Top 100 Medium-sized Cities Worth of Investment in China" and consecutively maintained 
the second place of the "top ten counties" of Sichuan Province from 1995 to 200751.  
As one of the most severely hit cities in the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, Shifang 
suffered heavy loss of life and major damage of infrastructure. After the earthquake, as a 
result, the Shifang government made great efforts to help the local economy recover. Under 
this consideration, with a registered capital of 100 million yuan and a $1.64 
billion investment in total, a copper-molybdenum refinery plant was planned by Hongda 
Corporation with the goal of promoting local GDP and employment rate. Moreover, this plant 
was encouraged, and of course permitted, by the Sichuan provincial government as the most 
great effort aiming at economic revitalization in the provincial “Twelfth-five” plan52.  
This copper-molybdenum refinery plant was managed by Sichuan Hongda Corporation 
whose boss , Liu Canglong, started his enterprise in Shifang and now came back to construct 
this profitable plant as a repayment to the hometown53. The project was intended to cover an 
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area of about 3,500 acres and the land was expropriated from two villages of Luoshui Town, 
Shifang, reclaiming property from more than 1,000 villagers from Hongmiao and 1,300 
villagers from Jinguang. The land expropriation was approved for the project use by the 
Shifang government in 2008, after the Sichuan earthquake.  
As a profitable plan also coveted by other municipal governments such as Chengdu and 
Shanghai, the Hongda copper-molybdenum refinery plant will greatly benefit the local 
economy once put into operation, just considering the perspective of profit. In the morning of 
June 29, 2012, the Hongda copper-molybdenum refinery plant laid its foundation in the 
Economic Development Zone of Shifang. On June 28, one day before its foundation 
ceremony, the official Sina Microblog account of Shifang government, named “Vital 
Shifang”, posted seven items to introduce this particular refinery plant. “Vital Shifang” first 
introduced the investment and benefits of this plant: 
“The first over 10 billion-investment project, Hongda copper-molybdenum refinery 
plant, held its opening ceremony in our Economic Development Zone at ten o’clock this 
morning… If this plant goes into operation, its annual sales income will be more than 50 
billion…its fixed employment will be more than 3000 and provide more that 15 thousand 
auxiliary employment opportunities.”54  
In addition, “Vital Shifang” also exposed the construction schedule of this project and 
claimed that the construction standards of the copper-molybdenum chemical plant could 
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reach advanced world-level standards in six aspects----planning, design, technology, 
equipment and installment, management, and custodian. All these aspects introduced by 
“Vital Shifang” deliberately underscored the environment-friendly quality of this plant: 
“This plant has passed the administrative approval of our State Environmental 
Protection Department. Carrying out these environmental protection measures, the 
pollutant could meet the emission standards…all the pollutant will be disposed with 
high technology and advanced equipment, realizing environmental recycling and 
zero emission.”55 
Despite the large number of job opportunities and great economic profit it would create, 
local residents were most concern most about the potential environmental risk of this plant. 
Some local residents believed that the pollutant will affect a wide sphere even including 
Chengdu, and as the center of the polluted area, Shifang would become the biggest village of 
cancer within the next five years. People also spread online that this plant might produce a 
variety of toxic byproducts, including mercury, sulphur, dioxide, and arsenic. So it was 
widely believed that this chemical plant would threaten the natural environment and harm 
public health if its pollutants seeped into the city’s air and water supply.  
Actually, there was no clear evidence showing whether the plant is environmentally 
harmful or not in the end. As well, the Shifang local government only ascribed the cancelling 
of the plant to the public objection rather than to the flaws of the plant itself. Even after the 
party secretary, Li Chengjin, promised to call off this plant, some officials still strongly 
defended that this plant had already passed environmental impact assessment and was the 
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most strictly regulated one in present-day China. In the government environmental 
assessment report, this plant was truly qualified as "environmentally acceptable." But since 
the government only publicized a short version of the report with no detailed information, 
citizens are not satisfied with the attitude of the government and speculate that there was 
corporation between the local government and the official evaluation agency. There was also 
an environmental evaluation report issued by Beijing General Institute of Mining & 
Metallurgy that claimed that, “This plant does have an affect on surface water, ground water, 
atmosphere environment, sound environment, solid waste environment and biological 
environment; however, all these effects are controllable.” 
Even assuming the evaluation report to have showing scientific foundations, local 
residents prefer to suspect its validity as the obscure data and evidence were beyond their 
understanding. In addition, people also doubted the government’s credibility to implement 
any practical custody or control of the chemical plant afterwards. Most of all, Hongda 
Corporation was accused of polluting crops last year by peasants from Luoshuo Town, 
Shichuan province. The infamy of this particular corporation, beyond all doubt, exaggerated 
the widespread concern among local people. Thus, anyhow, distrusting the government was 
always a rational choice for Shifang residents.  
In addition, there were two other factors that intensified the antagonistic emotion among 
local residents towards this plant. On one hand, the impact of the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 
made local people more concerned about their present and future living conditions. There 
were rumors among local residents that the over-exploitation of mineral resources in the past 
decades had made the geology more vulnerable to earthquakes and could be partially 
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responsible for the great loss in 2008. Since the refinery plant would be located in a seismic 
zone, the security risk would be extremely high if there were geologic activities in the future. 
Given these considerations, people in Shifang are highly sensitive to this project. On the other 
hand, there was hardly any information released by the local government on the plant’s 
construction in the past years, and of course, no public hearing in the decision making 
process as well. According to the report from Hongda Corporation, this plant was started in 
2010. However, in the past two years before the opening ceremony on 29 June, the public had 
not heard anything about such a big plant. Even the villagers who lived only miles from the 
location of the plant got to know it when they saw some officials from surrounding cities 
came to celebrate the laying of its foundation. As a result of the lack of transparency in the 
policy making process, the public were even enraged by the government’s dereliction in the 
earlier stage.  
Relevant information accompanied by rumors started spreading online, asserting the 
potential risk of the plant as well as criticizing the government’s conspiracy of sneaking in 
the plant without any public consultation. A widespread petition letter circulated online by 
protesters reads: “It will be too late to protest once the factory is built … How many of us 
have enough money to move away from the city? So we have to unite to expel the chemical 
plant out of Shifang.”56 Consequently, fears of the potential risk of this chemical plant and the 
hostility towards local government promptly provoked Shifang residents to get into the street.  
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3.2 Mobilization, Framing and Process of Shifang Protest 
Shifang protest was mainly mobilized online and by sending text messages. Although 
the contribution of cyberspace to modern collective resistance is widely acknowledged, it was 
still remarkable in China for using cyberspace as the main channel of mobilization. As most 
of the early participants in the Shifang protests were middle school students who were well-
educated and familiar with modern technology and equipment, this particular incident first 
took place in cyberspace, such as Shifang Baidu Post Bar, QQ groups and other online 
forums. Microblogging (or “weibo” as they are called in Chinese) also played an essential 
role in protest mobilization by disseminating information and drawing wide attention.  
One day after the founding ceremony, on June 30, a dozen of the citizens gathered in 
front of the building of the Shifang Municipal government to launch their petition and was 
soon persuaded to subside. In the next day, the petition became a “mass incident” as 
increasing numbers of people were gathering for the closure of the Hongda plant and most of 
the participants were middle school students who are called “Post-90” (the generation born in 
the decade of 1990). Schools were pushed to demand students come back with a warning of 
expelling them from school, but it did not work. Increasing numbers of participants was 
spurred to take to the street, including Shifang local students and their parents, other ordinary 
citizens and even students from surrounding cities who come to support the protest.  
As July 1st is the birthday of the Communist Party of China, the Shifang local 
government got even more nervous when people staged a large-scale campaign in such an 
important festival throughout the nation. However, the framing of the Shifang protestors’ 
demand was rather prudent throughout the whole process even though it soon turned into 
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violence. In the photos of the protest, people were carrying banners reading “Long lives the 
Chinese Communist Party, kick out the copper factory!”, “Protect our hometown and oppose 
the chemical factory’s construction” and “Unite to protect the environment for the next 
generation”. Although threatened by their schools with severe punishment, students did not 
stop but got even angrier. They wrote their slogan on the wall of the government building, 
proclaiming that, “We can sacrifice because we're the Post-90”. Among all these demands 
and slogans, the most disruptive one was which targeting the party secretary of Shifang, Li 
Chengjin. Protesters denounced Li as betraying his responsibility to his citizens in order to 
get profit from the certain project. People wrote on the wall and shouted in front of the 
government building, “Li Chengjin, get out of Shifang.” Actually, this kind of demand is a 
common phenomenon in China’s environmental campaigns as a result of the leading cadres' 
responsibility system. In the Qidong protest, another environmental protest against a 
proposed waste water pipeline in Jiangsu province also taking place in July 2012, the angry 
protesters even stormed into the party secretary’s office, dragged him out of the government 
building and ripped off his clothes.  
On June 30th, some students and citizens assembled outside the government building and 
blocked streets in downtown districts of Shifang, including East Tingjiang Road, West 
Tingjiang Road, Small Garden Road, and North Zhuanyuan Street. In response to this activity, 
local public security police of Shifang were dispatched to guard the government building and 
maintain order and the mass was soon persuaded to disperse. In the evening of July 1st, 
hundreds of protesters once again gathered in Hongda Square and outside the government 
building, signing a petition and shouting slogans for cancelling the refinery plant. The 
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Shifang local government did not clearly respond to the protesters, and no violent conflict 
between government and protesters was reported at that time. In addition, the official 
government website of Shifang published a letter which spoke highly of the advanced 
technology and environmentally friendly quality of Hongda refinery plant and described it as 
"scientific and modern". 
 As the atmosphere of this advocacy campaign heated up, not only the local students, but 
also other ordinary citizens as well as citizens from surrounding cities inspired by the 
students’ determination were involved in this collective action. The total numbers of this 
protest reached tens of thousands. In the morning of July 2, growing numbers of protestors 
assembled in front of Shifang government buildings again. Some of them were furious and 
impulsive as there was still no response from the government. These angry protestors pulled 
up the sign of the Shifang party committee, smashed it on the ground and stamped on it. At 
the same time, some of them pierced the protective cordon and stormed into the government 
building. According to the official statistics, these protesters smashed eight windows, three 
bulletin boards and four advertising boards.  
In order to appease the masses, at noon of July 2, the major of Shifang, Xu Guangyong 
and the Deputy Mayor, Zhang Daobin came out to speak to the public saying that the plant 
would be suspended in light of public concerns and promising that they wouldn’t restart 
construction without public support. Moreover, as reported by China News Service, Xu 
Guangyong also stated that, "The local government will definitely carry out supervision 
during the entire process of constructing the project. If the company fails in the 
environmental protection assessment, the local government will not allow it to go into 
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production." 57  This announcement seems like a temporary compromise aiming at 
maintaining the social order rather than making a practical concession to the advocacy 
campaign. So after this announcement, only some of the protesters left while most of them 
who were not satisfied still crowded in front of the government building demanding for 
further promises of policy adjustments since they did not believe the government will give 
the project up easily.  
According to the official media of Sichuan Province, at about 13:30 pm local time, July 
2nd, protestors started to attack the government building by throwing bricks, bottles and pots 
at the local public security police who were on duty and overturning a dozen of police 
vehicles. However, no violent suppression was utilized in this phase and only some of the 
police got injured in the conflict. The protest culminated at 14:00 in the afternoon when 
special public security police and armed police were dispatched to quell the protests and 
things then escalated to a bloody conflict between the police and ordinary citizens. In the 
confrontation, the police threw tear gas and stun grenades into the crowd to disperse the mass 
and beat citizens with batons, causing dozens of people to be injured in the process.  
After that, videos and photos were posted and circulated online that showed the images 
of bloody individuals who got injured by the stun grenades and badly beaten by the police in 
the conflicts. According to the report of the government, thirteen people were hurt in the 
process. Witnesses told the South China Morning Post that about 8,000 police were stationed 
along major roads, and apparently, it was the first time that stun grenades were used to 
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suppress a protest.58  
Just at the moment when the police started to quell the protest with violence, at 14:04 
pm, July 2, Shifang local authorities made further concessions which clearly proclaimed their 
decision to cancel the plant rather than suspending it. In addition, the local government 
dispatched working groups comprised of government cadres and staff to different districts 
and streets of Shifang to appease and communicate with local residents. Moreover, in order to 
remain accessible to its citizens, the Shifang local government posted its official email 
address and telephone number on Sina Microblog by “Vital Shifang”. In the evening of July 2, 
Shifang government issued a long notice tracing the whole process of this incident and 
demonstrating that thirteen people were injured in this conflict. Although witnesses to the 
conflict and other media entered the scene that day had reported more casualty than the 
government statistics, other facts stated by this notice were mostly compatible with other 
information sources.  
Despite receiving the clear promise from the government, protesters did not leave. 
What’s more, even the citizens who did not participate in the campaign got angrier with the 
violent suppression that had taken place the day before. Believing that it was the local 
government leaders that pretended to be friendly and benign on one hand while ordering the 
brutal police to suppress them with force on the other hand, thousands of people 
demonstrated on the street shouting, “Li Chengjin, get out of Shifang” with cursing him and 
his family members at the same time. Besides of this, the protesters were also dissatisfied 
with the government arresting people in the conflict the day before and claimed that most of 
                                                             
58 Shi, J. (2012, 08 15). Rumours fuel new protests in shifang. Retrieved from 
http://www.scmp.com/article/1006281/rumours-fuel-new-protests-shifang 
41 
 
the people arrested were teenagers. Moreover, hostility towards the police among Shifang 
citizens was ignited and rumors began to spread online, such as that the police had beaten 
several people to death, Shifang was blockaded by armed force, or even that they would 
shoot at citizens to maintain stability. There was a photo widely re-posted online showing a 
notice clinging on the door of a restaurant in Shifang, read “No Police and Dogs”. With the 
persistence of protesters, more special public security police and armed police were 
dispatched to Shifang. According to a witness, the police carrying batons in July 2 were 
changed to guns on July 3rd. 59  Journalists also reported that police were still there 
confronting the public and their vehicles shows that they were from other surrounding cities, 
including Chengdu, Deyang, and Mianyang60. 
In the evening of July 3rd, thousands of protesters once again gathered on Hongda 
Square demanding the police releasing these citizens who had been arrested the previous day. 
In addition, on seeing the experience of Dalian anti-PX protest, in which the cancelled project 
was restarted by the local government month later in silence, Shifang protesters kept asking 
for a further promise that this factory would be removed forever. Facing this coercion of the 
public, the party secretary, Li Chengjin, made the final concession in the afternoon of July 3:  
“Because of the lack of propaganda and communication in the earlier stage, 
some of the citizens do not understand nor support the construction of this plant. In 
order to satisfy the demands of our citizens, Shifang municipal Party committee and 
municipal government made a decision: we will firmly safeguard the legitimate 
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rights and interests of our citizens. As some people were strongly concerned that this 
copper -molybdenum refinery plant would cause environmental pollution and affect 
public health, we decide to call off the plant construction from now on and Shifang 
will no longer construct this plant in the future.”61 
The protest finally culminated in this announcement of Li Chengjin, presenting a 
remarkable success in the history of China’s environmental campaign. To further appease the 
emotion of local residents, Shifang government also group texted messages to proclaim their 
decision, making sure that it would be widely known. “Vital Shifang” also posted a notice 
clarifying that there was no death in the conflict of July 2 and that Shifang was not blocked 
by armed forces as well. Besides, to warn the protesters, the public security department of 
Shifang issued a notice named “Notice on the Prohibition of Illegal Assembly, Parade and 
Demonstration”:  
“First, anyone who used the Internet, mobile phones or text messages to 
mobilize collective action should immediately stop or they will be punished. Second, 
anyone who had already participated in this illegal activity should give themselves 
up to the police within three days or they would be punished.”62 
The protest eventually calmed down at the end of July 3. In order to respond to the 
demand of protesters for releasing the arrested people, in the early morning of July 4, Shifang 
government released a third notice explaining the situation of these people and claiming none 
of them were students: 
 “In order to deal with the riot in July 2, twenty-seven people were detained by 
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the police. Up to now, three of them were in criminal detention, three of them were 
in administrative detention, and the rest were all released by 23:00 pm after criticism 
and education”63 
In the evening of 7.5, Shifang government announced the decision of Deyang Municipal 
Part Committee to nominate a First Secretary Zuo Zheng for Shifang. 
 
3.3 Existence of Elite Division in the Shifang Case 
 By examining the resistance of the protesters, the suppression used by the police and the 
response of Shifang government, the study above presents the interaction between different 
actors in the process of Shifang protest. Besides the meaningful success it achieved by 
coercing the government to yield to public demand, Shifang case is also marked by both the 
fierce suppression and the friendly policy response it received simultaneously, or in other 
words, what makes the protest outstanding is the divergent attitude and incompatible 
behavior of different actors within the authority. Thus, who are these special public security 
police and armed police? And who have the authority to command these armed force to use 
violent suppression?  
To answer these questions, this section first introduces the vertical and horizontal control 
over Chinese public security organs, then analyses the command system of armed police in 
China. By examining these institutions and their command systems, the author suggests that: 
1) local governments in China do have the authority to command local security police organs, 
and this explains the moderate behavior of Shifang local public security police. 2) The special 
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police referred above are actually a special unit of public security police in China. Different 
from common public security police, the special police are riots police in China mainly in 
charge of antiterrorist, and antiriot operation, and dealing with social emergencies. However, 
commanding special police from different cities is beyond the ability of Shifang local 
government. 3) Armed police in China is actually a branch of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
and this military force can only be controlled by the top leader of its vertical professional 
agency. Thus, in conclusion, this section illustrates the existence of division between the 
Shifang local government and the police force dispatched to Shifang to put down the protest.  
 
Vertical and Horizontal Control over Public Security Organs  
“At about three o’clock in the afternoon…there were many heavily armed police, with 
camouflage and explosion-proof clothing, guarding every entrance of the courtyard. In 
addition, standing by both sides of the courtyard, a number of special police and armed police 
were confronting with the crowd with shields and batons. Judging from the license plates of 
these explosion-proof vehicles reading Chuan A, Chuan B and Chuan C, they came from 
Chengdu, Mianyang and Deyang respectively.”64 This paragraph is from the cover story of 
China Business News (Zhong guo jing ying bao) on July 9. What we can tell from this 
description is that this suppression had mobilized armed forces not only from Shifang but 
also from surrounding cities. A witness of Shifang protest also claimed that, “In the beginning 
of the protest, there were only some local police maintaining order. However, with more and 
more police coming from other places converging in Shifang, heated antagonistic emotion 
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rose among local citizens.”65  
There is also other evidence showing a different behavior between the special police 
dispatched to Shifang from other cities and Shifang’s local public security police. The 
following is part of the second announcement posted by “Vital Shifang” on July 2: 
“The agitated protesters stormed into the government building, throwing 
flowerpot, bottles and garbage towards the public security police who were on duty. 
Several policemen were injured in the process…but they (local public security police) 
persistently followed the attitude of forbearance and the principle of ‘neither shout 
back nor hit back’…However, the conflict escalated at about 2:00pm and the special 
police who were dispatched to carry out their task were forced to use tear gas and 
stun grenade to disperse the crowd.”66 
Not only thoroughly reported details about the process of the conflict in the afternoon of 
July 2 and describing the behavior of the on-duty local public security police as calm and 
sober, this announcement also deliberately distinguished between the local public security 
police and the special police dispatched to fulfill the task by obviously protecting the image 
of local public security police. So, who are the special police referred to in this announcement? 
And why did the Shifang local government prefer to expose the behavior of these special 
police while exempting the responsibility of the local public security police?  
The Special police referred to in this announcement is a special unit of public security 
police in China. Unlike common public security police, the special police are riot police in 
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China, mainly in charge of antiterrorist, and antiriot operation, and dealing with social 
emergencies. As most of the public security policemen are government officers who are not 
highly combat effective, the special police unit was established to handle some dangerous 
tasks. And generally speaking, most of the important cities have a unit of special police in 
their public security department. 
Given the large bureaucracy and the complex intergovernmental relationships of China, 
it is difficult to run such a complex police system effectively in China without both vertical 
and horizontal bureaucratic domains 67 . In other words, in the case of a specific public 
security police agency in a local area, it can be simultaneously commanded by both its 
vertical-professional superior bureaucracy and the horizontal local party committee and 
government. Then, in this condition, which boss has a larger power to command this 
particular agency, and why? Scholars 68always argue about whether it is actually “horizontal 
serves the vertical” or the “vertical serves the horizontal”. In terms of a local public security 
agency, the Chinese government coined a term itself to describe the “horizontal-vertical” 
relationship as “Tiao-Kuai” relationship (Tiao means vertical lines while Kuai means 
horizontal pieces). Thus, the principle of local leadership on public security work in China 
has been summed up as “Combining Tiao and Kuai leadership, with Kuai as the main part.”  
Unlike fiscal revenue which has been more tightly controlled by central government in 
order to strengthen the state capacity since the 1990s, the control over legal coercion is not as 
concentrated in present-day China. Although it is beyond local governments’ ability to 
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command armed police which consist of soldiers on duty, Chinese local governments can 
exert great control over local security police. There are several reasons that contribute to the 
local governments’ influence on police behavior. First, as it is inherently hard for the superior 
public security organs to gain information on local issues or monitor local activities, local 
party committees and governments enjoy great autonomy over local policing.69 Second, the 
“lesson of history” of early security crises has taught the party to adopt a decentralized 
coercive power structure to maintain social stability.70 According to Tanner, this “historical 
lesson” of China can be traced back to late 1930s, when the simply copy of Stalin’s secretive 
system caused massive crisis of the CPC Jiangxi government. Third, most of the key power 
resources of local security police are controlled by local governments, such as organizational 
and personnel power, financial resource, and monitoring power.71 
This understanding of the command system of public security organs can also be applied 
to the Shifang case, in which the local public security organ is under the control of the 
Shifang local government. Before the afternoon of July 2, even on July 1 which is the 
birthday of CCP, no violence took place between the police and the protestors. When people 
gathered to attack the government building in July 1, local police just maintained order 
without causing severe public hostility. However, when the armed police and special police 
from other cities were dispatched to Shifang, a bloody suppression policy was adopted 
towards the protesters. Afterwards, when the public started to criticize the behavior of police 
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online, there also was a ridiculous conflict online among public security police from different 
cities. In a popular Chinese real name online forum called “Renren”, a person named Chen 
Xiaogong declared himself to be a special policeman from Chengdu and said he never used 
violence towards ordinary citizens. Chen also claimed that all the stun grenades were thrown 
by the Mianyang police. This declaration caused heated debate between the police from 
different cities online and mutual abuse. 
Thus, the division between the special police and the Shifang’s local public security 
police is clear from the analysis of the command system of Chinese public security organs. 
First, the Shifang’s local public security organ is controlled by Shifang party committee and 
government. In this sense, the behavior of the Shifang’s local public security police can be 
regarded as a representative of the Shifang local government’s attitude. This explains why the 
local police kept calm in the process of the conflict and why the Shifang local government 
deliberately protected their image in the government announcement. Second, in the Shifang 
protest, special police units from different cities were dispatched to carry out suppression. 
However, it is beyond the Shifang local government’s ability to command the special police 
from other cities. The power of commanding special police units from different 
administrative areas comes from the vertical professional organ of the police system. Thus, in 
conclusion,   although the local public security organ obeys the principle of local government, 
the division still existed as the vertical command system of the police department is more 
effective when it comes to cross-regions issues. 
 
Command System of Armed Police Force in China 
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 Armed police are officially called “Chinese People's Armed Police Force” (CPAP). 
Some people misunderstand armed police to be “police”, but armed police are soldiers on 
service. This is no different from the People’s Liberation Army, which branched out from 
PLA as an independent armed force primarily responsible for civilian policing as well as 
providing support to PLA during wartime. As the primary mission of CPAP is internal guard, 
it was also named “Internal Guard” from January 1, 2005 to July 31, 2007 and changed to 
CPAP on August 1, 2007. The CAPA has a dual command structure including the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security.  
CAPA was first established in 1982, composed of the internal security units, border 
security unit, forest unit, gold mines unit and hydropower facilities, as well as traffic-policing, 
fire fighting and road construction units. Among them, the Border Security and fire fighting 
units are under the control of both CMC and Ministry of Public Security while the other 
forces are under the control of CMC only. The CAP is estimated to have a total strength of 
1.5 million, with over half its strength (800,000) employed in its internal security units72. 
Compared with the CPAP, the public security police department is a totally different system 
which is composed of real policemen as traditionally understood. In contrast with the armed 
police who are actually soldiers, the public security police are government officials.  
The authority to mobilize the CAPA must obey the statutory procedures of asking for the 
specific approval by the State Council and the Central Military Commission. Any unit or 
individual should not violate the provisions of using CAPA. If the CAPA receives a task that 
oversteps its authority, it should refuse to execute that task and immediately report to their 
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superiors. 
In terms of the political system of China, the CAPA is beyond the control of Chinese 
local governments. As Chinese government during the Hu Jintao Administration has placed 
more restriction on the local government’s use of violence against protests73, the decision to 
repress was made by higher authorities within the CAPA system based on their judgment of 
the protest’s characteristic. Thus, what Shifang local government can do is only ask the 
higher authority for cooperation.  
 
Modes of Repression in China 
China has seen a large amount of popular protest in recent years and repression is one of 
the importance responses from the authority when dealing with this resistance. Although the 
use of violence has been limited in recent years especially when the protests are not “regime-
threatening”, repression still remains an effective and important method of dealing with 
collective actions. In terms of the mode of repression, the Chinese governments may punish 
the participants, coercively dispersing protestors or bloodily suppressing the protesters. 
Punishment of the participants often includes arrest, detention, and jail sentence and local 
police security departments are always in charge of this punishment. Most protests will 
receive this level of repression, especially for the leaders of the collective action. Sometimes, 
police force was only dispatched to the scene to maintain order and protect public 
infrastructure. It will attract the attention of the public if the armed police coercively disperse 
or attack ordinary citizens with weapons such as tear gas and stun guns. The level of 
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repression escalates if the police use bloody violence towards the protestors, including using 
injurious weapons, attacking protesters to serious injury, or even opening fire on unarmed 
citizens. The highest level is repression with the army, which is regarded as national defense. 
The fierce repression received by the Shifang protestors was almost the most severe level of 
suppression, compared with other “non regime-threatening” protests in recent years. The 
severity of the suppression embodied in two dimensions: Armed forces were dispatched and 
weapons utilized in the suppression; indiscriminate violence towards ordinary citizens who 
did not participate into the collective action. 
It is the first time that the Chinese government utilized stun grenades in suppressing 
ordinary citizens’ resistance. A stun grenade is a non-lethal explosive which can cause 
temporarily disorient of senses. Although the stun grenade is designed as non-lethal, it causes 
injure and may cause death occasionally. Thus, the stun grenade is often used to subdue 
terrorist.  
The Shifang protest was also marked by the brutality of police during the process of 
suppression. Even the leader of the Shifang government conceded that the suppression was a 
measure of indiscriminate violence. The Vice Minister of Shifang Municipal Propaganda 
Department told the reporter of China Business News that, “There were some aggressive 
behaviors during the conflict. Not only these protesters, but also some of the onlookers also 
injured in the process”74.  
On July 3, some citizens were being treated in The Second People's Hospital of Shifang. 
Most of them claimed that they had not participated in the demonstration but got beaten when 
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they were watching the conflict or just passed by the scene of the protest. One of these 
injured Xiao Cao, who is a sixteen year-old boy, told the media that he was beaten by some 
policemen with a stun gun when he was taking his middle school diploma home and he didn’t 
know what happened at that time.75 
A famous public intellectual, Li Chengpeng, who arrived in Shifang in July 3 and was 
regarded as the public opinion leader of this protest recorded the same experience in his 
published article, “ A Case of the Lucifer Effect: A Little Investigation of Shifang”. In this 
report, he said that some of the citizens who were injured in the process are not even 
participants in the protest. He exposed the images of three injured people in the hospital and 
explained each of their experience of being beaten by the police. According to Li, all three of 
these people were not participants of this protest. One of them came to the surrounding area 
to buy some food, one was talking with friends on the way back from work, and the other one 
was an old man who was just passing by and looking at what was happening. The images of 
these people show the brutality of the police and Li said some of them would never recovered 
from their injuries. This report documented the brutality of the police towards ordinary 
citizens and was widely shared on the internet.  
 
Existence of Elite Division in Shifang Protest 
In contrast with the brutal violence utilized by the police, a second remarkable 
characteristic of the Shifang protest is the response and attitude of the local government. 
Although the Shifang municipal government should be denounced for its attempt to construct 
                                                             
75 Cui, W. (2012, 07 09). The Cover story: The truth behind the hundreds copper-molybdenum plant's death 
Chinese Business News, p. A09. 
53 
 
such an influential plant without consulting the public, this thesis demonstrates that the 
measures adopted by Shifang government in the face with the protest were appropriate to 
some degree.  
First, given the fact that the protest had already taken place on June 30 and July 1, the 
protesters were persuaded to leave by of the government officials and there were no severe 
conflicts in the early stage. As early as noon in July 2, before the citizens broke into the 
government building, the mayor of Shifang municipality, Xuguang Yong, and the Deputy 
Mayor, Zhang Daobin talked directly to the masses, expressly saying that the Hongda plant 
would be suspended from then on. Although this was not a reliable promise, it showed the 
basic attitude of the government for dealing with this event. 
Second，at two o’clock on the afternoon of July 2, the Shifang government issued a 
notice in “Vital Shifang”, indicating that "As some of the cadres and citizens were concerned 
about the environmental effect of Honda copper and molybdenum plant…We decide to stop 
the construction of the project from now on."76 This clear promise was issued at exactly the 
same time as the violent suppression by the police took place. This notice, which could have 
calmed down the conflict, did not avoid the bloody conflict between citizens and the police 
since the police ignore it. 
 Third，using the new tool of Microblog, the Shifang government kept following the 
situation in the unfolding of this conflict and tried to communicate with the public to clarify 
the truth. Compared with the citizens’ statements and the report of “Vital Shifang”, the facts 
exposed by the Shifang government were basically true. Even the well-known writer and 
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political critic, Hanhan, said in his blog "In general, (the Shifang government) did not 
lie ...and each step of improvement should be encouraged."77 
From July 2 to July 6, “Vital Shifang” posted thirteen Weibo microblogs in total to 
follow up and explain this incident, receiving 141 731 replies and being reposted 135,475 
times78. Guidance of public opinion is always emphasized as "rumors would be stopped by 
the truth." In this kind of incident, in general, rumors tend to have a larger guidance as a 
result of the limited information. Hence, accessible information and freedom of 
communication will diminish the value of rumors and thereby contribute to the pacification 
of the conflict. In this particular case, "Vital Shifang" described the whole incident indetail, 
especially how the police dispersed the protesters. In addition, it also announced the number 
of injuries, clarified there was no death in the conflict and explained the release situation of 
the protesters who were arrested. These measures effectively curbed the spread of rumors and 
played a significant role in forming public opinion.   
In addition， the measures adopted by the Shifang government went beyond these.  
Before the outbreak of the conflict in July 2, Shifang government started to send working 
groups to propagandize and explain the plant to residents and try to make people accept it. 
Opening all the relevant channels of newspapers, television, internet, and also distributing 
promotional materials to citizens, Shifang government did a lot to communicate with the 
public. After the outbreak of the conflict, Shifang TV channel looped the announcement of 
the city leaders on the decision to cancel the plant in a group text to the public to reiterate the 
decision. In addition, the government also provided a special telephone hotline and email 
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address to answer the public’s questions. 
In conclusion, with close scrutiny of Shifang case, the study shows there was an elite 
division between the Shifang local government and the police department, including armed 
police and the special public security police. Thus, if it is already clear that the authority itself 
is not an impervious one, how did the elite division affect the decision making of the Shifang 
government and consequently influence the outcome of the protest? 
 
3.4 Pressure on Local Government and its Countermeasure  
In China, local governments are more often targeted by social resistance than are central 
governments or other institutional agencies within the authority. There are several reasons: 
First, some Chinese citizens believe that most of the policies made by the central government 
are reasonable, but trampled by the local government during the process of implementation. 
Second, generally speaking, as local governments are responsible for local daily governance 
and have more opportunity to contact with local residents, they are always the one who 
violate the rights or interests of citizens directly79. Third, protesters in China prefer to frame 
their demands in legal ways to protect their legitimacy to solely target the local government 
in order and show their “non state-threatening” nature80. 
Hence, compared with the police department, local government is somehow different as 
its leaders have more concern than do the police because of their responsibility for 
unintended consequences. Especially in the traditional understanding of Chinese ordinary 
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citizens, local government is always the one responsible for every aspect of social life and all 
the failures of public administration. In terms of this particular incident, the most criticized 
aspect of the Shifang case was the opaque policy-making process in the early stage and brutal 
violence of the police towards ordinary citizens in the end. The fierce repression not only 
exacerbated the rage of local residents, but also spread over the internet and drew nation-wide 
attention. As a consequence, this broad social impact naturally drew the attention of the 
central government. 
Although neither the use of violence nor the level of repression can be decided by the 
local government, it has to be responsible for the resulting consequence. In this section, I 
argue that, the severe repression measures adopted by the police department rapidly drew 
widespread criticism towards the Shifang government and as a result put the local 
government in an awkward position facing great pressure.  
The pressure mainly comes from two aspects: First, pressure on the local government 
comes from the intervention of the central government. In the vertical political system of 
China, the destiny of a local government official is mainly controlled by his upper level 
authority. In this sense, managing to calm down social riots within its territory without 
causing intervention from the upper level authority would be the goal of Chinese local 
government leaders. Second, the pressure on local government also comes from the public. In 
the Shifang case, the participation of public intellectuals, widely using the free media and 
especially the microblog, and the post-90 students who were regarded as the new strength of 
China’s civil society brought impetus to the development of this protest, exerting even greater 
pressure on the local government for dealing with the incident.  
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Facing this embarrassing situation, the Shifang local government was pushed to take 
countermeasures to release the pressure. To deal with the trouble, the local government 
attempted to please the citizens by making concessions to their demands and behaved in a 
rather benign way. This section analyzes the two sources of pressure exerted on the Shifang 
local government both from the central government and the public while at the same time 
examining the specific countermeasures adopted by the Shifang government. 
 
Pressure from the Central government 
In terms of the attitude of the central government towards popular protest, it may 
tolerate some of the resistance in order to release social tension while suppressing the others 
according to its judgment of their nature 81. Since too much concession will inspire the 
citizens to stage even more resistance while excessive violence will shake the legitimacy of 
the regime, the central government expects local governments to find a reasonable settlement 
for local resistance in order to limit it within a controllable level.  
As a result of the lack of legal elections or other public participation channels, both the 
measurement of local performance and the destiny of individual government officials are 
decided by their superior in this vertical system. Thus, in China’s hierarchical political system, 
it is always a top concern for local governments to please the upper level authority or central 
government. According to Cai, as local governments are the ones who are responsible for 
local governance, ineffective repression or serious casualties will signal the failure of local 
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governments to maintain social stability and draw attention from central government.82 So, 
local governments have only constrained autonomy to deal with popular resistance and these 
certain constraint, or pressure in other words, come from the intervention by the central 
government.  
In this particular case of Shifang, pressure from the central government can be found in 
the reports and editorials of the state-run newspaper Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao). Global 
Times is a daily newspaper under the auspices of the People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) 
newspaper, which is an organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 
From the general consensus of Chinese citizens, Global Times is a state-run newspaper which 
can represent the attitude of the central government. But in fact, the Global Times cannot be 
regarded as the tongue of the central government as a whole. Strictly speaking, none of the 
Chinese official media serve as the tongue of the central government, even People’s Daily. 
This is because important official media in China is always controlled by different factions 
within the bureaucratic system. Global Times is marked by its populist and nationalist 
approach among official media and there is always apparent divergence between Global 
Times and People’s Daily. However, as there was no coverage or no clear attitude was shown 
on the case of Shifang in People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, Xinhua Website, and other 
official media, Global Times is the only relatively reliable source to represent the pressure 
from the central government in this context. 
From July 3 to July 5, Global Times issued three successive articles criticizing the 
failure of the Shifang government while to deal with this social conflict. The first article 
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publicized in July 3 was as follows: 
“In many cases, government officials take the chance that it is very easy to 
overcome different opinions in the society, and some even believe that people will 
not aware of what are they doing…They (Shifang local government) turned a simple 
problem into a serious conflict, and even hurt the image of our party and our 
government.”83 
This is a rather severe criticism for a local government to receive from the central 
government. Since central government always regards the image of the regime as a top 
priority while local governments are more concerned with policy implementation 84 , it 
presents a big failure of a local government if its performance has damaged the image the 
party-state. In July 4, another article was published by Global Time stated:  
“As the party secretary said in the interview, the objection of the public towards 
this chemical plant comes from lack of communication in the early stage. Obviously, 
there was a flaw in the decision making process…An important plant approved by 
the State Environmental Protection Department was eventually made infamous (by 
the local government), as if the project itself is wrong, no matter where it would be 
constructed …”85 
Also, the editorial of July 5 reads that:  
“Shifang local government made mistakes in the decision making process by 
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neglecting public opinion. This mistake led to antagonism between the government 
and the public…In this process, Shifang government and Deyang government should 
pay attention to public participation and information publicity and sincerely reflect 
on their mistakes.”86 
 
Pressure from the Public 
The pressure from the public can be found by examining both the attitude of Shifang 
citizens towards their local government as events unfolded as well as overall public opinion 
on the Shifang protest on the internet. This section demonstrates the existence of pressure 
from the public towards the Shifang local government as a result of the bloody repression.  
Before analyzing the pressure and its influence, there is the question of why bloody 
repression will cover so much reaction from the public that the focus of the public opinion 
thoroughly moved from the opaque policy making process to the suppression itself?  
First, in contrast to the opaque policy making which can be labeled a lack of democracy, 
the bloody violence upgraded this incident to the criminal level of trampling on the human 
rights of ordinary citizens. The behavior of the police caused a panic among the public and 
gave ammunition to the critics who regard the authoritarian regime as a “Leviathan”. As a 
famous “post-80s” writer and political critic who has many fans in China, Hanhan said in his 
blog article, “If the local government uses a stun grenade on the residents, actually it has 
already admitted its tyranny…the blinding flash of light recorded the moment of history 
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which you can never erase.”87 Also, Li Chengpeng described the behavior of the police as:  
“They kept striking on ordinary citizens when teenagers were pulling their 
banner, when parents were asking for their children, when the plant was already 
called off, when the people arrested was released…that is to say, they choose to use 
violence no matter whether it is necessary…This demonstrates that they are not 
nervous or impulsive in fact, they are just too confident, arrogant and disdain 
communicating. Hence， the conclusion will be, when a government is strong 
enough, its probability of making mistakes is far beyond our imagination.”88  
Second, since the online supervision was lenient in the Shifang case, a large number of 
bloody images and videos were spread online and raised people’s sympathy for the suffering 
of Shifang citizens and hostility towards the government. Among these images, two were 
reposted most online and was widely used by western media in their reports. One of them 
shows a police officer chasing a girl to beat her. When the image was publicized online, 
people stared to search for this particular policeman in reality and exposed his name, 
occupation and family address in the online forum. The other image shows a girl stretching 
out her arms to deter the police. This image reminded the public of another image showing a 
girl carrying a poster reading, “PLA, I love you” in the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 and 
damaged people’s feeling towards state apparatus. In consequence, these photos severely 
exaggerated the tension between government and citizens. 
Third，the Shifang protest was notable as most of the participants were young teenagers. 
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The antagonistic emotion became even more serious when people thought of those teenagers 
and their own children and realize that the government would still dare to quell the young 
generation with armed force just as they did in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protest. Local 
citizens persisted in demonstrating after the government’s concession when they heard that 
some students were arrested by the police. Hanhan publicized an article on July 3, speaking 
highly of the post-90s to be the hope of China’s democracy89. In addition, news praising 
young students was composed by both Chinese media and western media. The BBC News 
reported the Shifang case on July 4 named “Post-90s in Shifang Protest Become the Centre of 
Attention” and praised the role of the students, saying that “It is an indisputable fact that they 
(the students) have made great contribution in the resistance.” 90  Also, Leslie Hook, an 
editorial writer of the Financial Times, wrote that the protests "revealed a potentially 
important shift in the country's politics: youth were at the forefront of the three-day 
demonstration, exposing a new vein of activism in a generation seen by many as apathetic."91 
Moreover, alarmed by the participation of students in the demonstration, the state-run Global 
Times newspaper issued an editorial on 6 July titled "Do Not Foment Youngsters to Protest." 
The editorial warned “The participation of young demonstrators should not be encouraged. 
They should be kept out of mass protests and especially political conflicts.”92 
All these factors contributed to the pressure faced by the Shifang local government. Not 
only were the local residents of Shifang enraged by the excessive violence towards their 
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people, according to a survey by the IRI consulting firm of online public opinion from July 1 
to July 10, 37.8% of the opinion expressed online shows an antipathy or satirical attitude 
towards the Shifang local government.93 Hence, the overwhelming pressure from the public 
pushed the Shifang local government to take countermeasures to deal with this situation. To 
clarify the relationship between the growth trend of public opinion and the attitude of 
government, this study also cites a research result compiled by the IRI consulting firm.  
This chart shows the growth trend of online public opinion. Since the beginning of the 
Shifang protest, especially after the clash between protesters and police on July 2, this 
particular incident drew heated attention quikly on the internet with the wide spread of 
relevant pictures and video. “Shifang” became the top searched keyword on Sina Microblog 
and Internet users expressed their anger and their condemnation of the local government as 
the result of the bloody violence. In this chart, the index of internet public opinion increased 
rapidly in the first two days. Despite the Shifang government leaders having already 
promised to stop the plant’s construction in the afternoon of July 2, this concession did not 
appease the public criticism as the violent repression had offset the effort of the local 
government. The increasing public opposition culminated in the afternoon of July 3 when the 
plant was officially called off; however, the index only shows a slowly decreasing trend from 
July 3 to July 4. In that period, Shifang protesters are still advocating resistance and 
demanding for the release of the arrested citizens. Public opinion finally calmed down after 
the afternoon of July 4 when the government made further concessions to release these 
people. 
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Figure 3-1. Growth Trend of Online Public Opinion Index94 
By examining the successive criticism from the central government and the growing 
trend of public opinion, this section compares of the measures adopted by the local 
government with the pressure it faced. In conclusion, the section suggests a correlation of the 
accumulation of pressure and the concessions made by the Shifang government, while in turn, 
the concession did help the local government to appease the conflict and release the public 
pressure.     
In conclusion, the pressure faced by Shifang local government comes from both the 
criticism from the central government and the public opinion of the citizens. However, the 
proportion of significance of these two sources of pressure cannot be calculated or compared 
in this single case. Although we can tell from the statistics that the gradual policy adjustment 
made by the Shifang local government is almost compatible with the spreading of public 
opinion, there is no clear evidence showing whether the central government’s attitude is more 
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important and direct on influencing the behavior of the local government. But what is more 
important is that the central government’s attitude is not independent of the public pressure. 
The central government is not designed to play a role as a judge or a mediator between the 
local governments and the public, in most situations, the central government itself prefers to 
ignore popular protests when it does not damage the image or the legitimacy of the party-
state. In the Shifang case, the central government’s clearly attitude was also related with the 
overwhelming public opinion on this issue.  
 
3.5 Alternative Explanation - Strength of Social Media and Forceful Resistance 
Strength of Social Media in Shifang Case 
As mentioned above, the media played a significant role in Shifang case and was thus 
regarded as an alternative explanation for the positive policy outcome. Since the Shifang case 
was first mobilized online and then drew widespread attention as photos and articles were 
reposted on the website, it is necessary to pay attention to the important role of internet in this 
particular case. In this section, despite conceding the great effect of social media on the 
development of Shifang case, however, by comparing with another case, Ningbo anti-PX 
protest, this study also suggests that whether the media will have such great influence on a 
particular case still depends on the government’s decision of controlling the media.  
Sina Microblog was the most important information source, filling with photos, 
comments, and official announcements in this particular case. Other website or online forums, 
such as Baidu post bar and Tencent Microblog also played a part in the process. According to 
statistics, the “Shifang” case initiated 2384 related news reports, 764,784 comments on these 
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reports by the online population, and involving 243 relevant websites in total. Besides these, 
this case also involved 121 relevant blog articles, 218 posts in online forums with 4326 
responses following these posts.95  
What is worth mentioning here is that the supervision of public opinion was abnormally 
lenient in this particular case. In terms of the Chinese government’s conventional treatment 
similar situations, the name of the protest is usually regarded as a “sensitive word” online and 
most of the posts and comments would be deleted promptly. However, in the Shifang case, 
only several of the extremely hostile or anti-state words were limited and even the bloody 
pictures kept spreading online. Some people believe this represented a progress for the 
Chinese government to relax supervision of public opinion although other people suspected 
the motivation of central government to be some kind of conspiracy. There is no way to 
detect the real reason why the authority decided to leave a space for public opinion in the 
Shifang case, but one should not overlook the ability of Chinese government to control the 
freedom of speech. 
This section compares Ningbo anti-PX case, another significant environmental protest 
took place in Zhen Hai district of NingBo city in 2012, with Shifang case to show that the 
condition of free speech was not always lenient and was highly dependent on the attitude of 
Chinese authority.  
In Oct 25 and 16, 2012, more than a thousand people gathered in Ningbo Tianyi square 
and in front of the government building to protest against a plan to expand a petrochemical 
plant. Carrying a placard reading “PX...Get out of Ningbo!”, the protesters claimed that an 
                                                             
95 IRI Consulting Firm. (2012). Shifang case: Gas tear cannot resolve nimby movement. Informally published 
manuscript . 
 
67 
 
chemical element, paraxylene, that would be produced by this plant was a serious carcinogen. 
Police were also dispatched to crack down on the protest but no bloody violence was reported 
in this case. However, in the Ningbo anti-PX case, journalists were banned from covering it 
in China and discussion of the protests on microblogs was blocked as well. The name of the 
district, “Zhenhai”, cannot be searched or posted online and relevant photos and comments 
were deleted. Citizens within the Ningbo area were limited to the use of uploaded 
photographs through Sina or Tencent Microblog in that period.  
Overall, even though cyberspace and social media have contributed to an informational 
politics in China by making the internet a new means, stake and areana of political struggle96, 
it is risky to overestimate the importance of social media from such a special case by 
demonstrating the effectiveness of Chinese government to control the internet. 
 
The Shifang Protest, A Forceful Resistance or Not? 
Apart from the strength of social media, the determination and solidarity of Shifang 
local residents also made a remarkable contribution to the outcome of this resistance. The 
strong motivation of Shifang local residents to protect their hometown reflected an increasing 
environmental awareness among Chinese citizens, while the admirable courage to resist 
violence represented a developing consciousness of civil rights. However, is Shifang protest a 
forceful resistance besides the precious spirit and strong motivation? Using a theory 
developed by Cai Yongshun in analyzing successful protests in modern China, this section 
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argues that Shifang case is not a qualified “forceful resistance” which is likely to lead to 
larger positive outcomes. On the contrary, by assessing different dimensions of this particular 
case, I suggest the Shifang protest is a hard case which is not likely to achieve positive 
government policy response under normal evaluation.  
Although it is not new to use a cost-benefit approach to analysis collective resistance, 
Cai has developed a specific calculation model to analyze the rationale behind different 
outcomes achieved by modern Chinese “non-political” collective resistances.97 Although his 
concepts of “outcome” or “success” are different from the single “policy adjustment” aspect 
focused in our thesis, this section will only use the evaluation method of “forceful resistance” 
which is not affected by how we define success.  
As Cai suggested, participants are most likely to succeed when their demands are less 
costly and their action is forceful.98 As mentioned early in this chapter, the Hongda copper-
molybdenum refinery plant would provide great profits and employment opportunities for the 
recovery of the local economy as well as having a significant status in the “Twelfth-five” plan 
of Sichuan province. Hence, it is reasonable for us to regard the concession of Shifang local 
government to give up this plant as costly option. 
As for the factors which contribute to staging successful resistance, Cai defined 
“forceful resistance” with several dimensions. First, in China’s authoritarian political system, 
the most important constraint exerted on local government is the intervention from central 
government. However, as the threshold of the central-government intervention is relatively 
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high, it would be a great leverage if the participants in a certain protest have the ability to 
achieve upper-level intervention. Second, it will be beneficial if the participants in a certain 
resistance have useful social networks which can help them gain support among the 
bureaucratic elite.99Third, using violence is always counterproductive as this tactic will be 
highly unacceptable to local governments in most situations.  
Turn to the case of Shifang protest, it seems rather plausible that it is a forceful 
resistance as it has successfully drew attention from central government and gained a benign 
attitude from local government leaders. However, when we undertake close scrutiny of the 
Shifang case, most of the protesters are middle school students who even took the risk of 
being expelled from school and other ordinary citizens living in such a small county-level city. 
In this sense, this particular campaign is not a strong organization which has a lot of useful 
resources or leverage to coerce the local government to make concessions. A comparison can 
be made between the Shifang protest and the Xiamen anti-PX protest in 2007, which was 
regarded as an outstanding example of successful protests in present-day China. The 
participants in the Xiamen protest were mostly urban middle class, who utilized a full range 
of repertoires to achieve success with a mostly peaceful demonstration. In the Xiamen case, a 
number of scientists, including scientists in office within the legislature, signed a petition to 
the central government refusing the PX-plant. Well-known real estate businessmen, who have 
a concern about property values, along with school presidents and teachers worried about 
their recruitment, cooperated to gain support from inside the local government. However, 
among the social celebrities and scientists, who has ever united to speak for the Shifang 
                                                             
99 Yongshun Cai (2010). Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, p.87 
70 
 
people as happened in Xiamen? Even at the end of the incident, whether the Hongda plant 
was polluted was still unknown. Just because Shifang protest was not a forceful resistance 
based on its own ability, it was repressed by the police without any hesitation or 
communication. Moreover, the use of violence also aggravated the disadvantages and soon 
incurred fierce repression from the police department. 
However, if the Shifang protest is not as forceful as it seems to be, then why did it gain 
intervention from the upper-level and make the local government leader yield to its 
requirement step by step? From the evidence provided in this chapter, the central government 
started to exert pressure on the Shifang local government as the bloody repression and 
indiscriminate violence had undermined the image of the government among the public. In 
this sense, the central government’s intervention was never a “leverage” that was sought by 
Shifang protesters in their strategies; instead, it was just a consequence after the settlement of 
a particular resistance had a very bad political effect. Also, as shown earlier in this chapter, 
the positive response of local government leaders was not a result of the “social network” 
owned by Shifang protesters.  
Demonstrating the Shifang protest to be a less “forceful” one, it is more reasonable to 
regard the Shifang protest as a case that has less opportunity to have policy response. More 
importantly, the extent to which the Shifang case was not as forceful as other successive 
social resistances means that the case can be regarded as “extreme” by achieving such a 
positive policy adjustment.  
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Chapter IV: Understanding the Shifang Case from Modern Chinese Politics  
The last chapter demonstrated an elite division between the police department and 
Shifang local government. But why these two actors adopt different measures to deal with 
popular protest and what are the principles they are following? To further understand the 
Shifang case, this chapter puts the elite division of these two actors into a larger institutional 
background of China’s modern political climate. This chapter provides a possible explanation 
that the elite division in the Shifang case is an embodiment of the structural division between 
Chinese local governments and the stability maintenance system.  
There are three main goals of this chapter. First, this chapter introduces the stability 
maintenance system in China by examining its development, financial investment and 
institutional structure. Second, by analyzing Chinese local governments’ characteristic of 
“institutional amphibiousness”, this study demonstrates that Chinese local governments are 
neither just the executors of upper authority policies nor public servants of citizens in present-
day China. This judgment on Chinese local governments lays theoretical foundation for 
analyzing its collaboration and division with the stability maintenance system. Third, this 
chapter illustrates two mechanisms through which the collaboration between local 
governments and the stability maintenance system collapses.  
 
4.1 Stability Maintenance System in China 
The 1978 reform of China legalized multiple forms of ownership and encouraged the 
growth of private and collective enterprises outside the state sector100. With more than thirty 
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years’ rapid economic growth in China, the nature of capital and market led to a requirement 
for compatible social and political reform. However, decades of economic development has 
not provided benefit to all Chinese citizens equally. Conversely, the gap between the rich and 
poor created a highly differentiated society which contains more social conflicts. Government 
officials and state-owned enterprises leaders formed cooperative monopolies through 
corruption and nepotism to expel private enterprises, while at the same time eroding social 
justice and equity exaggerates confrontation between the government and citizens. Moreover, 
as there is no legitimate channel to express their grievance, citizens were forced to stage 
collective actions since it seems to be the only effective way to bargain with governments. 
Despite this, as demonstrated in earlier chapters, most social resistance in present-day 
China involves disruptive tactics aimed at specific benefits rather than state-threatening 
activities. Liping Sun, a professor of Tsinghua University, described Chinese society as a 
“mirage of turbulence” within which most of the unrest can be solved expediently.101 Dingxin 
Zhao also agrees that Chinese social resistance is far from revolutionary turmoil. 102  In 
addition, some scholars are rather optimistic about the future of CCP and deem the present 
period as the best opportunity for the Party-state to deepen reforms. According to Yongnian 
Zheng, this best opportunity comes from the growth of central resources in recent years 
which makes it possible for the Chinese government to implement extensive welfare policies 
to resolve social conflicts and recover the government’s legitimacy.103 
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However, despite the good financial situation of Chinese central government in recent 
years, rather than extending social security and social welfare budget, a great proportion of 
government expenditure was used as “stability maintenance” funds. China is among the states 
that invest the largest financial resources to ensure stability. Scholars always compare public 
security expenditure with military expenditure to illustrate the state’s emphasis on internal 
contend. In 2009, the public security expenditure of China was 514 billion yuan and the 
military expenditure was 532.1 billion yuan. In 2010, the public security expenditure was 
548.6 billion yuan and in 2011, for the first time the public security expenditure which was 
624.4 billion yuan outnumbered the military expenditure of 601.1 billion yuan in the same 
year. In 2012, the public security expenditure was 701.7 billion yuan while the military 
expenditure was 670.2.104 Although the Chinese government claimed that “public security 
expenditure” is not equal to “stability maintenance expenditure”, within the public security 
expenditure in 2011, the expenditure of public security department was up to 322.5 billion 
yuan, armed police department 104.6 billion yuan105. So, why such a great proportion of 
government expenditure was used for maintaining social stability?  
In the last ten years, social conditions became more intractable in China. The growth of 
the internet and modern communication technology, Chinese citizens’ awareness of human 
rights, the influence of the Arab Spring Movement, as well as the accessible and friendly 
image of the top leaders, created more difficulties for the Chinese government to deal with 
increasing social unrest, even they are mostly not state-threatening. Thus, there seems to be 
no choice for Chinese government but to carry out meaningful policy or implement rigid 
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maintenance of social stability.      
Under this circumstance, in the last decade, especially in the second term of the Hu 
Jintao administration, maintaining social stability became the top priority of Chinese 
governments. Thus, the Party-state set up a national wide “stability maintenance” system 
whose offices can be found at every level of Chinese government. The center of the stability 
maintenance system is named “Central Government Leading Group for Stability Maintenance” 
and located inside the “Central Political and Law Committee”. There is also a standing office 
beneath the center charged with collecting and analyzing information on social conflicts 
across the nation. The “Central Political and Law Committee” is a powerful and 
characteristically Chinese organ whose full name is “Politics and Law Commission of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China”. This agency is designed to be 
responsible to the CPC Central Committee for political and legal affairs. However, in practice, 
this organ and its subordinate agencies that were established at all Chinese government levels 
oversee all administrative and judicial authorities. The composition of the “Political and law 
Commission” is complex and very powerful, including public security departments, 
procuratorate departments, the judicial system, the state security, and also propaganda 
departments. As an internal organization of the CCP, the “Political and law Commission” is 
always criticized as the greatest intervention in China’s judicial independence. Moreover, this 
political condition largely enhances the status of the public security system in China and 
some people even describe China as a “police state”. 
In addition to its powerful central leading group, stability maintenance offices were 
established across the country including in Beijing, the provinces and autonomous regions, 
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cities, counties, villages, and even streets and neighborhoods. In consequence, the 
systematizing of the stability maintenance system creates a large population of personnel who 
implement the task of maintaining social stability. Thus, this “stability maintenance” industry 
has nourished a large interest group who obtained both political and economic resources from 
the great policy emphasis on stability. Yujie, a Chinese political writer and democracy activist 
who suffered one-year of house arrest by the CCP before emigrating to the U.S. in January 
2012, reported his conversation with a district policeman. In this conversation, the policeman 
told him that during his monitoring in Beijing, their district was able to enjoy millions of 
Yuan for maintaining stability and now his only task is to supervise him.106Also, according to 
an investigation in Yun’an County, Hunan province, 1800 jobs out of 6700 in total who 
receive financial allocation as their salary in that county are related to the stability 
maintenance system.107 
This particular interest group covers the whole system of stability maintenance from top 
leaders of central governments to local governments, including the Commission of Politics 
and Law at different levels, armed police department, the public security department, and so 
on. This powerful interest group, which has more access to influence policy-making process, 
deters the social and political reforms which would harm their vital interest. When 
confronting social resistance, the instinctive response of the police system is to suppress the 
protesters and threaten them with arrogant attitudes. In addition，to maintain their political 
power and the large amount of government expenditure on their group, they sometimes 
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exaggerate social contradictions and thus wield their power of repression.  
However, what should be mentioned here is that the “Political and law Commission” is 
not representative of the central government; conversely, it is becoming an independent 
powerful interest group which is somehow out of the control of the central government. As 
for the relationship between central government and stability maintenance system, in the first 
place, maintaining social stability is a common interest of the whole bureaucratic system of 
China. So generally speaking, the interests of these two actors are not opposite to each other.    
But there is no doubt that they are two different actors in this case, not only inferred 
from this case, but also reflected from the political changes in recent years. Evidence 
accumulates to prove the conflicts between the top leaders of stability maintenance and other 
top leaders within the central government, and this division is always pried by western media 
and some informed Chinese citizens. During the 18th CPC National Congress, the secretary 
of “Political and law Commission” was downgraded to be out of the Politburo Standing 
Committee and since then, several important government officials of this political faction was 
punished for varied reasons. As it is difficult to find reliable evidence to prove the conflict 
within the central government, the only fact we conclude from this case is that we should 
examine these two actors separately.  
As for the case of Shifang protest, although it is unknown whether the authority of 
commanding the police is out of the control of the central government, like most cases, 
central government should have known about the settlement in advance. Also, the criticism 
from central government towards Shifang local government does not mean a wrong judgment 
on the actors who should be in charge of this suppression. On the contrary, it is reasonable for 
77 
 
the central government to blame the local government as its responsibility of local 
management. In order to examine the division between local government and the stability 
maintenance system, in this context, this study regards the central government as a neutral 
actor who did not show clear preference besides protecting their image and legitimacy.  
Thus, elites who have not benefited from or even actually suffer from the stability 
maintenance policy behave differently from the stability maintenance system. In terms of the 
local governments, obviously, it is far beyond reality to defend their behavior of 
implementing rigid stability maintenance towards social resistance as well as seeking 
personal profit by depriving the rights of ordinary citizens. However, in recent years, in order 
to appease social conflicts and control these social incidents, local government leaders are 
more inclined to “spend money to buy peace” or to make concessions to popular protests 
without using either the legal channel nor repression. However, sometimes this behavior not 
only sacrifices the authority of laws but also encourages more people to see the effectiveness 
of taking a disruptive action. So, what is the action logic of Chinese local governments when 
dealing with the awkward situation between the superior authority and the public? And what 
is the relationship between Chinese local governments and the stability maintenance system?  
 
4.2 The Institutional Amphibiousness of Chinese Local Governments 
          The second chapter demonstrates the role played by Chinese local governments in the 
policy making process as “institutional amphibiousness”. This section aims to analyze the 
specific cost-benefit balance that Chinese local governments are facing when choosing 
between private goods and good performance. 
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On the other hand, since the Chinese government is not popular elected through legal 
procedures, it has to rely heavily on good performance in order to compensate for the lack of 
procedural legitimacy. When the performance legitimacy buttressed by economic 
development waned after several decades of economic growing, the civil society started to 
coerce the local government to resolve their grievances by targeting local government’s 
excessive power over controlling the society. In this perspective, the action logic of Chinese 
local government is to balance both good performance and their invested interest in terms of 
specific issues and the environment. Chinese local government is more likely to collaborate 
with the stability maintenance system when sacrificing a certain degree of good performance, 
such as violating the property rights of citizens, in exchange for better access to private goods 
through trade. However, when the interest and benefit acquired through this collaboration 
diminishes or even becomes harmful, the collaboration ends. Thus, the only way to get rid of 
the trouble is to rely on good performance. And under the condition in which making 
meaningful institutional measures are prohibitive, good performance means a benign attitude, 
and compensation and concession with or without principles.  
 
4.3 Collaboration and Division between Local Governments and the Stability 
Maintenance System 
Local government leaders would like to collaborate with the stability maintenance 
system for two main reasons: First, given the nature of the authoritarian regime with neither 
effective an channel of public participation nor public monitoring mechanisms, it is routine 
for local government leaders in China to hide their policy making process and to make 
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personal profits through corruption and depriving ordinary citizens. Thus, most petitions or 
protests are targeting local governments by exposing their faults on corruption, over taxation, 
polluting the environment, or their illegal behavior in encroaching on land and resettlement. 
To disguise their faults by deterring and suppressing local unrest, local government leaders 
enjoy the privilege of abusing power under the name of maintaining social stability. In 
addition, as the cadre assessment standards highlight the aspect of maintaining social stability; 
Chinese local governments’ leaders are rather nervous about serious social incidents that will 
draw the attention of the central government. To control the social conflicts to a certain 
degree but without seeking meaningful resolution, local governments prefer to collaborate 
with the stability maintenance system to suppress these incidents to avoid being called to 
account from upper level authority. 
However, when the number of both petitions and protests increased rapidly and effective 
ways to bargain with the governments became widely known by Chinese citizens108, the 
collaboration between local governments and the stability maintenance system collapsed as a 
result of the awkward situation faced by local government leaders. First, the increasing 
number of protests and petitions in local areas has exhausted the financial resources and 
caused a “fiscal fatigue”109 of local governments. Since it is a tradition for Chinese citizens to 
complain about local issues by launching their petition to Beijings’ central Xinfang bureau, 
there are always government officials in Beijing dispatched to local governments all over the 
nation to contact and deter these petitioners, especially during the “two sessions” period in 
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Beijing. In dealing with these petitioners, there are three main methods for local government 
leaders to “buy peace” for themselves, the first is to supervise these petitioners by 
government officers in the petitioners’ neighborhoods and villages, the second is to outsource 
this task to other social organizations such as private security firms, the third is to bribe 
relevant agencies to delete the central governments’ records of petitions they cannot deter.110  
All these three measures are highly expensive. For example, there is a famous petitioner 
Tanghui in Hunan province, whose daughter was forced into prostitution. Tang kept 
petitioning for seven years after 2006, 111 and according to the local government of Fu Jiaqiao 
Town, 800,000 yuan was spend on the stability maintenance on this single case in the past 
seven years. However, the situation would be even worse when social grievance became 
popular protests. In terms of protests, either compensating these protestors with money or 
suppressing them with violence would be costly for local governments. Obviously, this 
situation of “fiscal fatigue” violates the local governments’ incentives to pursue financial 
resources.  
Second, as the cadre assessment standards became stricter on stability maintenance 
performance and it seems even less possible for local governments to control information in 
recent years, repression is no longer a good option for local government leaders as the 
influence of a violent incident will not only draw public attention but also incur punishment 
from central government. In 2010, the central government issued a document named 
“Temporary provision on the enforcement of the responsibilities of government and party 
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leaders”, which proclaimed the responsibility of local government leaders on the social 
incidents which threaten social stability. This principle is also named the “zero-incident rule” 
by Chinese government leaders. Of course, the “zero-incident rule” does not mean there 
should not be any incident at all, instead, it only means there shouldn’t be any large-scale 
riots or severe social conflicts which would cause the intervention of the central government. 
In addition, there is also a strict assessment approach named “one-vote vetoes”, which is 
interpreted as “one failure (in stability maintenance), all achievements voided”112by local 
leaders. Obviously, this rule exerts great pressure on local cadres who can be vetoed by the 
particular selection criterion even if only one severe social incident took place in his 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the wide use of internet, cell phone and other modern technology 
makes it almost impossible for local governments to control the spread of information. As the 
state control over social media is not as strict as before, it became even more difficult for 
local government to keep social unrest from being perceived by the public and higher 
authority. Under this circumstance, the local governments, who are responsible for unlimited 
problems with quite limited resources, are caught between the public criticism and the central 
government’s punishment. 
In conclusion, the implementation of rigid stability has trapped Chinese governments in 
a vicious circle. Given the enormous financial burden faced by local governments, their 
leaders manage to create profit by constructing industrial projects or selling land in local 
areas. These measures always lead to more social dissents and conflicts. When these conflicts 
were expressed by social resistance, more investment on maintaining stability financial 
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expenses exhausts the financial resources of local government and sometimes even destroys 
the career of local leaders. Thus, under the name of “maintaining stability”, local government 
leaders face both financial burdens of dealing with social resistance and political threats to 
their career. As He Qinglian concludes, “Chinese local governments, being at the forefront of 
conflicts between government authority and the people, are increasingly weary of the never-
ending stability maintenance measures, both in terms of budget input and the patience of 
grassroots officials.”113 Thus, as a result of the “institutional amphibiousness” of Chinese 
local government, when the benefit getting from maintaining rigid stability minimized for 
Chinese local governments, the collaboration between the stability maintenance system and 
local governments collapse. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
As Tarrow says, “A diverse and changing society is producing a rich and complex 
panoply of studies of contentious politics.”114The political condition of authoritarian regimes, 
especially those undertaking liberalizing reforms such as contemporary China, may provide 
popular protests a variety of political opportunities, from flexible to stable. Indeed, not only 
the macro institutional design and policy priority but also a subtle change of a known variable 
will create a new political opportunity contour confronted by Chinese popular protests.  
This study places great emphasis on the importance of inside factors within the regime. 
Unlike existing literatures which mostly focuses on the development of the civil society or 
the conflicts between the society and the state, this study highlights the importance of the 
tension between different political actors within the state on influencing the policy outcomes 
of the protests. In actuality, the state-centered perspective of this study definitely does not 
mean I believe in the state’s capability of deliberately leaving space for popular protests or 
being well equipped to control social conflict in a certain degree. On the contrary, the non-
monolithic feature of Chinese government limits its ability to control the society and makes it 
more permeable to the demands of social resistance.  
However, the internal tension within the regime is not groundless. In this study, I also 
demonstrate that this elite division is also promoted by the increasing number of social 
resistance in China. In addition to the internal factors within the state actor, there are multiple 
aspects of the society and increasingly intractable variables that are beyond the control of the 
state, such as the development of communication technology, the influence of western 
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ideology and increasing rights awareness among Chinese citizens. By exhausting the 
financial resources of “maintaining stability” policy that dominated in the last decade and 
exerting great pressure on local governments, Chinese popular protests are actually forcing 
the authority to make concessions to public desires. Thus, it is too early to regard Chinese 
social resistance as just a moderate compensation for the absence of meaningful political 
reform. The Chinese government is not the one who shapes the reality in most situations; 
contrariwise, they are struggling with difficulties both inside and outside the regime and 
adjusting their behavior according to the reality which shapes it. 
This study of Shifang protest builds a theory that the elite division between the police 
system and the Shifang local government had influence the policy outcome of this protest. 
However, there comes another issue. If the elite division is a stable and structural variable in 
present-day Chinese political environment, then how are varied outcomes explained from 
different cases? To answer this question, this study argues that the success of Chinese popular 
protests is always highly conditional even the elite division between the stability maintenance 
system and local governments is a relatively stable feature in the political environment.  
That is mainly because the mechanism between the elite division and policy responses 
includes many other factors which can also influence the behavior of key actors. First, there 
are conditions under which the effectiveness of the elite division will be hidden. As I have 
mentioned in chapter three, if the participants of a particular protest are powerful enough with 
considerable political and economic resources, the police are less likely to use violence in 
repression, making the division hidden in these cases. As well, if the media is restricted 
strictly on reporting a protest and the protest is unable to draw wide public attention, then 
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there would be little pressure faced by the local government to repress the protests. In this 
circumstance, the local government may still choose to collaborate with the stability 
maintenance system. Second, even when the elite division is not hidden by other factors, the 
local governments have to deal with different stakeholders and balance varied interests in 
particular cases. If the cost is too high to make concession, or if the central government 
factually support the behavior of the stability maintenance system on specific issues, then 
these factors will also influence the policy-making process and the local government may 
have different policy preference.  
Thus, in conclusion, as the lack of research on other popular protests in present-day 
China, it is still unknown whether this “elite division” exists widely among other cases or 
under what condition this variable will be effective. Thus, the validity of this theory still 
awaits further testing.   
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